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"At present it appears rather doubtful whether they will ever 
be worked for their platinum content" 
P A Wagner, on the chromitite deposits of the Bushveld Complex, 1929. 
Abstract 
The current weak state of the platinum market, as well as the large inventory of platinum group metals held by Russia, necessitates that the South African platinum 
mining industry must carefully evaluate the benefits and disadvantage of small-scale 
mining of shallow, open castable ore resources. 
Until the late 1980's, these resources were ignored due to the metallurgical complexities of 
treating oxidized ore, as well as the mind set that existed within the South African mining 
industry which militated against open cast mining in the Bushveld. During the latter part of the 
1980's and early 1990's, advances in the metallurgical treatment of oxidized ore, specifically 
the UG2, as well as operational problems, created the impetus to begin the exploitation of 
these resources. 
Small-scale open cast mining has become viable due to the development of suitable mining 
methods that facilitate mining practices acceptable to the Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs, in terms of environmental legislation. 
Metallurgical advances and growing experience, especially with respect to the UG2, enables 
reasonable platinum group metals recovery from oxidized ore. The problems experienced in 
doing this can, and are being overcome. With growing public awareness of environmental 
issues, particularly related to the mining industry, the requirement to ensure that the 
small-scale open cast mine site is well managed is paramount. 
A methodology for the evaluation is presented along with a case study of a small-scale UG2 
open cast pit. Evidence is presented that shows that these small-scale open cast mining 
operations are extremely profitable and require minimal capital expenditure. However, caution 
is advised when evaluating Merensky Reef open cast operations because of the problems that 
they present. 
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Chapter 1 
Platinum Group Metals &·the Bushveld Comple~ . 
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1.0 Introduction: 
r - -
The aim of this dissertation is to present small-scale open cast mining of the UG2 as a viable option, both to existing mines and to new mines in the western Bushveld 
Complex. The first chapter examines the state of the platinum group metals market 
and the changes that have taken place between 1993 and 1996 in supply and demand. The 
future of the market is examined briefly to set the scene for the role that small-scale open cast 
mining of the UG2 can play. The geology of the western Bushveld Complex is reviewed, with 
special reference to the UG2. 
In chapter two the history of this kind of small-scale mining is outlined and the mining 
methods and economics of open cast mining of the UG2 is examined. Before considering a 
case study of a specific small UG2 open cast operation in chapter five, a number of pertinent 
issues, of great importance to any open cast project are discussed in chapters three and four. 
Chapter three looks at the specific metallurgical problems that need to be addressed in treating 
shallow, oxidized UG2 ore, and the implications that they have on recovery of PGM's and the 
performance of the concentrator and smelting operations. In chapter four the environmental 
considerations of open cast mining are discussed, with reference to the legal requirements and 
the Environmental Management Programme Report. 
Chapter five presents a detailed, financial and operational case study of the evaluation of a 
small-scale UG2 open cast project. It details the methodology of the project from a 
pre-feasibility desktop study, through to production and examines the actual performance of 
the project against that predicted by the feasibility study. Conclusions are presented in chapter 
six, along with a discussion of the future potential for this type of small-scale open cast 
mining, for both the UG2 and the Merensky Reef, in the western Bushveld Complex. 
1 
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1.1 Platinum Group Metals 
The Platinum Group Metals (pGM's) are a unique group of related elements comprised of 
platinum (Pt), palladium (Pd), rhodium (Rh), .osJTIium (as), iridium (Ir) and ruthenium (Ru). 
They share several properties that make them valuable both as industrial metals and as 
precious metals. Pt, Pd and Rh all possess important catalytic properties, as well as electrical 
properties that create an important industrial demand in addition to demand as precious 
m~als. The closely related as, Ir and Ru have similar properties, and are used as hardeners for 
Pt, Pd and Rh, although only Ru acts as a catalyst. The standard metre is composed of a Pt-Ir 
alloy in the ratio of 90% Pt to 10% Ir. as is the heaviest known element in the periodic table. 
The PGM's are produced both as primary products, mainly from layered intrusions and placer 
deposits, and as secondary products, mainly as a by-product of copper-nickel and gold 
deposits. Vermaak (1995) estimates that the world resource of PGM's is approximately 
112 735 tons of contained metal. However, this estimate only considers resources down tp a 
maximum depth of 1 200m below surface. As several of the major South African producers 
are already beginning to produce from depths below 1 OOOm this estimate is considered to be 
somewhat conservative. A slightly older report (Minerals Bureau, 1992) estimates world 
resources ofPGM's to be 67041 t, down to a depth of2 700. This estimate also includes gold 
in addition to the PGM's. Most of the South African production comes from one of the 
Bushveld Complex's three platiniferous "reefs"; the Merensky Reef, the UG2 Chromfiite and 
the Platreef Vermaak (op. cit.) estimates that the Bushveld Complex contains some 53% of 
world's PGM resources. The Minerals Bureau (1992) estimates that the Bushveld Complex 
contains 87.9% of world resources. Whichever estimate is accepted, it is clear the Bushveld 
Complex of South Africa is certainly the largest known repository ofPGM's in the world. 
South Africa is the largest producer of PGM's in the world, followed by Russia and then 
North America. The three largest South African producers are, in order of size, Amplats, 
Impala and Lonrho. Some minor production also comes from Northam in the Bushveld 
Complex, the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, and from Palabora Copper Mine. The Russian 
production comes primarily from the Noril'sk Nickel Combine (NNC) with minor primary 
production from placer deposits in the Urals. The North American production comes from 
both primary sources, such as Stillwater in the USA and the North American Palladium Mine 
2 
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in Canada, as well as from secondary producers such as the Sudbury and Raglan nickel mines. 
Other minor production comes from Columbia (placer deposits), Australia (nickel deposits), 
Finland (nickel deposits), Baltic States (copper deposits) and, increasingly important, 
Zimbabwe (layered intrusion). -< 
1.2 PGM Supply 
1.2.1 Relative Production of Pt, Pd & Rh 
Of the six PGM's, Pt, Pd and Rh are economically the most important and this section will 
concentrate on the factors which affect the supply and demand of these three elements. In this 
section the supply and demand of PGM's over a four year period, 1993 to 1996, will be 
examined and related in a later section to price. It must be borne in mind that it is virtually 
impossible to vary the production rates of the PGM's individually. The primary PGM deposits 
are polymetallic. An increase in the Pt producti~n will, de facto, cause an increase in the' Pd 
and Rh production. The ratio of the various PGM's, in the Merensky Reef of ~hewestern 
Bushveld Complex for example, for Pt:Pd:Rh is 16.42:8.45: 1 and for the UG2 the ratio is 
6.57:3.0:1 (Vermaak, 1995). The Merensky revenuelkg of metal produced is very sensitive to 
the base metal prices (Cu & Ni). This, combined with the fact that the larger producers in 
South Africa (Amplats and Impala) are more and more exploiting their relatively untouched 
UG2 reserves following a move taken by the Lonrho Group in the early 1980's, as well as for 
strategic reasons, directly affects the relative proportions of the various PGM's produced. 
Stillwater, in the USA, is a primary Pd producer, the ratio of Pt:Pd:Rh being 16.16:58.25:1 
(Vermaak, 1995). Placer deposits, on the other hand tend to consist almost entirely of resistate 
Pt and a little Rh, as Pd is more mobile in the secondary environment. The tenor of PGM' s in 
Ni deposits tend to be highly variable and, as the PGM's are produced as by-products, their 
production tends to follow the vagaries of base metal prices and production. 
1.3 Platinum Supply and Demand 
The information contained in this section is a precis of data gathered from several sources. 
Unless otherwise stated, the sources are Johnson Matthey Annual and Interim Reviews, 
3 
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Minerals Bureau of South Africa Annual Reports and. various stockbroking reports and 
reviews. All sources are listed in the Bibliography and References at the end of this work. 
During the period under review, Pt supply has <risen steadily, from 4.39 Moz in f993 to 4.53 
Moz in 1994 and up again to 4.98 Moz in 1995. In 1996 Pt supply is expected to drop off 
slightly to 4.77 Moz. Of the 4.39 Moz produced in 1993, 3.36 Moz were produced by the 
three main South African producers, Amplats, Impala and Lomho. Russia -pioduced 680 000 
oz; North America 200 000 oz and a further 120 000 oz were produced by various other 
producers (Table 1.1). 
Pt demand is governed by demand in eight main sectors: autocatalysts, chemical, electrical, 
glass, investment, jewellery, petroleum and others. A ninth, and slightly artificial sector, is 
termed "Western sales to China". If there is an excess in supply over demand, the excess goes 
into "stocks" (in Western countries, not Russia). Similarly, if there is a shortfall, it is met from 
stocks (presuming that stocks are sufficiently large.). 
In 1993, auto catalysts accounted for 1.685 Moz ofPt, of which 275 000 oz was sourced from 
recycling and recovery ofPt from scrap. Use ofPt in the automobile industry is governed by 
the fortunes of mainly western economies, as well as clean air legislation in those countries. 
Pt demand in the jewellery sector, especially in Japan, continued to grow, as it has since the 
early 1980's and accounted for 1.615 Moz in 1993. Investment,again mainly in Japan, 
accounted for 305 000 oz in 1993, up from 255 000 oz in 1992. Most other sectors either 
remained static or showed a small change in requirements for this period (Table 1.1). Overall 
demand in 1993 was 4.025 Moz, with a further 20 000 oz going to China. Against a supply 
figure of 4.39 Moz, this meant that 345000 oz went into stockpiles. 
In 1994 there was a dramatic change in the supply figures with South African production 
dropping to 3.16 Moz, Russia's sales increasing to 1.01 Moz, North America's production 
remained static at 220 000 oz and production from other producers increasing to 140 000 oz. 
The enormous increase of Russian sales reflects a large draw-down on strategic stockpiles 
rather than an increase in production. 
4 
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The bulk of Russian production comes from Noril'sk as a by-product of nickel and copper 
mining with only some 150000 oz coming from placer deposits, which are believed to be near 
to exhaustion. The increase of 49% in platinum. delivered by Russia is believed to reflect a 
need for hard currency at the time. During tHe-'period 1990-1993, the nickel output of the 
Noril'sk Nickel Combine fell by an estimated 45%, due to serious financial difficulties, 
resulting in a lack of finances to maintain production. Severe weather caused major problems 
at their smelters early in 1994 and an explosion at a power station in Noveniber 1994 further 
curtailed production. 
Political "upheaval" in South Africa during 1994 is blamed for the drop in production 
compared to the 1993 figures. The period prior to the April election was dominated by strikes, 
protests and a general lack of direction and insensitivity on the part of management to the 
imminent new dispensation. The almost immediate introduction after the elections of several 
new public holidays and the inability of management structures to arrive at mutually acceptable 
agreement to cope with these, highlighted this. ~M (part of the Amplats Group) experienced 
a severe bottleneck at their smelter complex, caused by a modernization programme then 
underway. Impala closed No.ll Shaft, recognizing its lack of profitability and problems were 
also encountered at their concentrators. All these factors contributed to a drop in South 
African production during 1994. 
Total demand in 1994 was up to 4.56 Moz against the supply of 4.53 Moz, creating a shortfall 
of 30 000 oz, which came from stocks (Table 1.1). Virtually every sector, including sales to 
China, showed increased demand. The exception being the petroleum sector, which took only 
90 000 oz compared to 105 000 oz the previous year. At the time, it was felt that much of the 
demand was driven by fears over the South African elections and the effect the new 
dispensation would have on future short to medium term supply. The Japanese market 
especially, seemed to purchase more than it required. In retrospect, it can be seen that the 
demand was driven by a general recovery of western economies and the various sectors have 
generally increased their off-take in subsequent years. The possible exception to this is the 
investment sector, which is speculative by nature, and took 395 000 oz in 1994. The two 
largest sectors, auto catalysts and jewellery both increased their demand to 1.685 Moz (of 
which 310 000 oz came from recycling) and 1.74 Moz respectively (Table 1.1). 
5 
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TABLE 1.1 
Platinum Supply and Demand 1993-1996 ('000 OZ) 
SUPPLY 1993 . 1994 1995 1996 
South Africa 3.,3.60 3,160 3,370 3,420 
Russia 680 1,010 1,280 1,100 
North America 220 220 240 225 
Others 130 140 100 105 
Total supply 4,390 4,530 1,9~0 4,850 
DEMAND 
~utocatalysts gross: 1,685 1,870 1,850 1,820 
recovery: -275 -310 -335 -370 
Chemical 180 190 215 220 
Electrical 165 185 215 235 
Glass 80 160 225 225 
Investment 305 395 345 235 
Jewellery 1,615 1,740 1,810 1,840 
Petroleum 105 90 120 125 
Other 165 190 225 260 
Sales to China 20 50 130 180 
Total Demand 4,045 4,560 4,800 4,590 
Movement in Stocks 345 -30 190 80 
(After Johnson Matthey, 1996) 
In 1995, South Africa produced 3.37 Moz ofPt, recovering somewhat from the setbacks the 
previous year. Russian sales increased to 1.28 Moz and North America increased production 
. -
to 240 OOOoz. Production from other sources declined to 100 000 oz, giving a grand total for 
production of 4.98 Moz. The Russian sales were 188% of the 1994 sales. It is estimated that 
the Russian primary Pt production amounted to about 700 000 oz in 1995, therefore some 
580 000 oz were drawn-down from stocks in 1995. The increase in South African production 
is attributed to several factors : RPM's modernization was completed in late 1994 providing 
better metallurgical recoveries as well as utilizing the concentrate backlog created during the 
modernization process; increased metallurgical recoveries reported from the Lomho Group 
and slightly increased production from Northam. On the down side, Impala' s main Merensky 
furnace was put out of action for six weeks from August 1995 due to a matte runaway and a 
fire which that caused. It was not until late November that Impala once again reached full 
production at the smelters. Some 56 OOOt of concentrate had to be "put on the floor" locking 
up 120 OOOoz of Pt. This, compounded by lower production from underground than 
6 
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anticipated meant that Impala's overall Pt production dropped from 1.01 Moz in 1994 to 
900 000 oz in 1995, forcing them to buy metal on the spot market to fulfil contractual 
arrangements. Impala reopened No. 11 shaft and ~so increased production from No. 14 shaft 
in an attempt to alleviate some of these problems. Despite the fact that production at Northam 
was up slightly, year on year, it was still battling to make a profit, and by June had spent R397 
million of the R504 million it had raised through a rights issue early in 1995. 
A~ mentioned previously, 1995 showed further demand increases, with total demand rising to 
4.80 Moz. All sectors except investment and auto catalysts showed increases. Increases in the 
jewellery sector in Japan were due to the strength of the Yen pushing platinum prices to its 
lowest levels since the 1970's, prompting increased buying at what were perceived to be low 
prices. The decline in demand in the auto catalyst sector was primarily due to increasing 
application of Pd-rich auto catalysts at the expense of the more costly Pt autocatalysts. China 
boosted its off-take to 130 000 oz, mainly for use in their jewellery and industrial sectors. 
The recently published Johnson Matthey Interim Results (1996), details the performance of the 
suppliers and industrial demand, based on the first nine months of the calendar year, and 
provides forecasts for the whole year. This indicates that total production is expected to fall to 
4.85 Moz. South African production has risen by a meagre 1% to 3.42 Moz, due mainly to 
Impala processing the concentrate they were forced to put on the ground after the accident at 
their smelter during 1995. Russia's sales are down from 1,28 Moz in 1995 to 1.1 Moz in 
1996, due to lower demand from the Japanese markets. North America's production will 
probably fall slightly to 225 OOOoz despite a 15% increase in output from Stillwater. The drop 
in output is due mainly to the variable PGM grade of the Ni deposits in Canada which provide 
a sizeable proportion of the North American production, as well as a reported drop of head 
grade at the North American Palladium Mine. Production from other producers will increase 
by ± 5 000 oz to 105 000 oz, (due mainly to the Hartley Mine coming on-line and production 
from Mimosa) giving a grand total of4.85 Moz, as shown in Table 1.1. 
The 1996 production year in South Africa got off to a very poor start. All three producers 
reported low productivity and a failure to meet production targets. Although this will have 
given Impala a welcomed opportunity to process the stockpiled concentrate, created when it 
lost its main furnace in August 1995, their annual production will probably not greatly exceed 
7 
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900 OOOoz, despite several years of attempting to produce 1.0 Moz of PGM. The strikes early 
in 1996 at Amplats have created a shortfall of 150000 oz. However, Amplats may have made 
up some of the lost production through its new UG2 open cast operation at Amandelbult and 
its Merensky open cast at Bleskop. As most of the production of the South African producers 
is sold forward, in the form of contracts, this means that Amplats will have to purchase 150 
000 oz on the spot market to fulfil its contractual obligations. Effectively this means that the 
market will be short of 300 000 oz. Although production in South AfTIca ""Unproved in the 
latter part of 1996, the effects of this will not be seen until the 1997 reporting year. 
1996 sees the first year of production of PGM's from Zimbabwe's Hartley Mine. This is 
estimated to be approximately 10 000 oz of Pt and is included in "others" in Table 1.1. 
Although most of the South African producers tend to dismiss Hartley's production, it is felt 
that this will be dangerous in the long term. BHP, Hartley's owner, is aggressively expanding 
in the PGM exploration/mining field and will be a force to be reckoned with in time. Strategic 
considerations will, it is believed, become more, and more important once Russia depletes its 
stockpiles, making Hartley more attractive to western purchasers. Total productio~ ~s likely to 
be down to about 4.85 Moz with Russian sales having dropped to 1.1 Moz. 
Demand in 1996 is expected to be in the region of 4.77 Moz, a drop of 30 000 oz over the 
1995 figure. The increasing substitution of Pd autocatalysts will to some extent be offset by 
increasing demand for Pt auto catalysts for diesel vehicles, especially in Europe. The other 
great unknown is, of course, the Chinese market, which is expected to absorb 180 000 oz in 
1996. The jewellery demand is expected to increase slightly to 1.84 Moz in 1996. Any growth 
in the jewellery sector will largely be met from Pt in investment bullion taken up in 1994. The 
Japanese jewellery sector is coming under increasing pressure due to competition from gold, 
and a slow down in the Japanese economy. To some extent this is offset by increasing use of 
alloys with a higher Pt content. 
Industrial demand will rise by 65 000 oz, due to small growth in most sectors. An interesting 
new growth area is that of fuel cells. The US Government has instituted a subsidy programme 
to encourage the commercialization of non-polluting power sources. Funds have also been 
made available to the Department of Defence to install fuel cells at all military installations 
across the US. Perhaps this marks the beginning of the long awaited expansion in the 
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application of fuel cells. During 1996, Mercedes Benz launched its first fuel cell powered Zero 
Emission Vehicle. This application is expected to increase over the next few years so that the 
automobile manufacturers can comply with curre!)t legislation, in respect of requirements that 
a certain proportion of vehicles sold are Zero Emission Vehicles, especially in North America. 
1.4 Palladium Supply and Demand 
r- -
The Pd supply over the same period, 1993-1996, shows a slightly different picture. In 1993, 
the total Pd supply was 4.28 Moz, of which 1.395 Moz were produced by South Africa, 2.4 
Moz by Russia, 415 000 oz by North America and 70 000 oz by other producers (Table 1.2). 
Like Pt, palladium's demand is made up of several sectors: autocatalyst, chemical, dental, 
electrical, jewellery and "others" (Table 1.2). Of these, electrical ( electronic) applications were 
by far the most important until 1996, consuming ± 50% of production. The dental sector was 
the next most important sector followed by autocatalysts. This situation changed in 1996. 
In 1993, total demand was 4.265 Moz, of which electrical applications utilized 2.015 Moz, 
dentistry 1.21 Moz, and autocatalysts, 705000 oz (of which 100000 oz came from recycling). 
Demand and production were fairly well matched in 1993, with only 15 000 oz going into 
stocks. 
1994 saw a dramatic increase in supply, from 4.28 Moz in 1993 up to 5.28 Moz in 1994, an 
increase of over 23%. This increase was due to increased production in South Africa to 1.5 
Moz and a substantial increase in Russian sales to 3.3 Moz, up from 2.4 Moz in 1993. This 
took place, as mentioned previously, against a backdrop of very low production levels at 
Noril'sk and it is felt that the bulk of this was drawn down from stockpiles. It is difficult to 
estimate exactly how much of the 3.3 Moz was primary production and how much was drawn 
from stockpiles, as Russia does not publish any data on this. However, if the 1989 supply 
figures are taken to represent only primary supply, because Russia had not begun to sell 
PGM's from its stockpiles in any quantity at that time, and allowing for the fact that that 
production had dropped by 45% between 1990-1993, some 2.0 Moz must have been sourced 
from stockpiles during 1994. South African production of Pd rose slightly despite the 
9 
dissert-J/JO/97 
problems encountered in production, mentioned above, mainly due to the increased proportion 
ofUG2 ore being processed by all three of the major South African producers. 
In 1994, supply exceeded demand by some 4LD ~000 oz, with demand of 4.87 Moz against a 
supply of 5.28 Moz (Table 1.2). Demand in all sectors increased, except in the chemical 
sector. Autocatalyst demand grew by 270 000 oz while recovery from recycling increased by 
only 5 000 oz. Electrical use increased by 215 000 oz and dentistry by 5 S- 000 oz. Demand in 
ot~er unspecified sectors grew by 80 000 oz. 
TABLE 1.2 
Palladium Supply and Demand 1993-1996 ('000 oz) 
SUPPLY 1993 1994 1995 1996 
South Africa 1,395 1,500 1,600 1,670 
Russia 2,400 3,300 4,200 3,800 
North America 415 220 470 435 
Others 70 140 70 75 
Total supply 4,280 5,280 6,340 5,980 
DEMAND 
Electrical 2,015 2,230 2,650 2,120 
Dental 1,210 1,265 1,300 1,310 
Autocatalysts gross: 705 975 1,730 2,270 
recovery: -100 -105 -115 -135 
Chemical 190 185 210 220 
Jewellery 210 205 205 200 
Other 35 115 120 125 
Total Demand 4,265 4,870 6,100 6,110 
Movement in Stocks 15 410 240 -130 
(After Johnson Matthey, 1996) 
1995 saw yet another astounding increase in Pd supply, up to 6.34 Moz from 5.28 Moz the 
previous year (Table 1.2). Once again this reflected a massive increase of Russian sales, up 
900 000 oz from 3.3 Moz in 1994 to 4.20 Moz in 1995. South African production increased 
to 1.6 Moz in 1995, mainly due to technical factors : RPM (Amplats) processed the 
concentrate that it had stockpiled while its smelters were being modernized; Lonrho increased 
production due to an increase in head-grades and recoveries, and production at Northam 
increased slightly. It will be remembered that Impala had lost their main furnace due to an 
accident late in 1995, but the effects of this were negligible in terms ofPd supply. The supply 
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from North America increased to 470 000 oz mainly due to the North American Palladium 
Mine in Canada coming on line as well as increased production at Sudbury, due to the high Ni 
price. Stillwater's production dropped slightly due to expansion that generated large amounts 
of "low-grade" tonnage. 
1995 saw a dramatic change in the use by sector (Table 1.2). Autocatalysts suddenly almost 
doubled demand to 1.73 Moz with only 115 000 oz being sourced from recycling. Dental 
applications grew (due to changes in the Japanese state health care system) as did electrical 
applications. The huge increase in demand by the autocatalyst sector was in response to new 
"clean-air" legislation both in western Europe and in North America. Although there was a 
concomitant decrease in Pt demand for petrol powered vehicles, this was offset by an increase 
in demand for Pt catalysts for diesel powered vehicles, created by the same legislation. 
However, the Pd loading (amount ofPd used in a catalytic converter) is greater than that ofPt 
catalysts. The growth in demand in the electrical sector was driven by increasing manufacture 
of MLCC's (Multi Layered Ceramic Capacitors), which are used in cellular telephones and 
computers, and continues to do so. Some of the increasing demand in these sectors may have 
been supplied from bullion held in investment bars taken up in 1994, but the scale of this is 
impossible to estimate. Total demand was up to 6.1 Moz, 25% up on 1994. Despite this, 
240 000 oz went into stock, as supplies had risen to 6.34 Moz (Table 1.2). 
As discussed previously, the early part of the 1996 production year was plagued by low 
productivity in South Africa as well as strikes at Amplats which affected the Pt production. 
These problems similarly affected the Pd production. It is expected that Pd supply will drop 
slightly to 5.98 Moz, the bulk of which will, once again, be supplied by Russia. Russian sales 
are expected to be in the region of 3.8 Moz in 1996. South African supply will increase to 
around 1.67 Moz, and North American supply could decrease to 435 000 oz. This decrease is 
due to lower grade production from the North American Palladium Mine and ITom other 
secondary producers in Canada. New supply is expected from Falconbridge's Raglan Mine in 
Northern Quebec during the 1997-1998 year. Zimbabwe's Hartley Mine will also contribute to 
Pd supply in the 1996-1997 year, but this will be a negligible amount. In all, the supply of Pd 
for 1996 is estimated to be approximately 5.98 Moz, up 80% on the 1989 supply figure of 
3.235 Moz. 
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It is expected that Pd demand in 1996 will increase to around 6.11 Moz. Autocatalyst demand 
will continue to increase as will electrical demand, making up the bulk of this increase in 
demand. Russian sales will once again exceed actual production, but due to the low Pd spot 
price, it is felt that Russian sales will simply take up the slack in the market, probably selling 
± 3.8 Moz. It appears that the threat of substitution worries the Russian producers. This was 
especially evident in 1995 when they increased sales to 4.2 Moz in the face of threats of 
substitution on the part of the Japanese Kyocera Corp. when Pd reached $174/oz (Mining 
Joyrnal, March 1995). This fear probably reflects the fact that Russia still holds vast stockpiles 
of Pd and would like to see Pd trade at prices that will not confer any benefit in substituting 
base metals for Pd (Mining Journal, 1995). 
1.5 Rhodium Supply and Demand 
By far the largest producer ofRh is South Africa. In 1993 total Rh supply was 376 000 oz, of 
which South Africa provided 278000 oz (or 74%), Russia 80000 oz, North America 17000 
oz and 1 000 oz were produced by other producers (Table 1.3). 
Rh production has increased due mainly to two factors: firstly, increased overall production of 
Pt and Pd and secondly, an increasing proportion of that production being sourced from the 
UG2 in which the Rh makes up ± 9% of contained metal as opposed to ± 3% in the Merensky 
reef This is an ongoing trend, as will be seen in the data for 1994-1996 (Table 1.3), and goes 
hand-in-hand with increasing Pd supply from South Africa, despite the Pt supply reducing in 
1994. As with Pt and Pd, Rh has several applications, notably autocatalysts (the largest sector 
by far). It is also used in the chemical, electrical and glass fabrication sectors. 
In 1993, Rh demand in the autocatalyst sector was 356 000 oz, including 26 000 oz from 
recycling (Table 1.3). Total demand was 365000 oz against a supply of376 000 oz," requiring 
11 000 oz to be taken up by stockpiles. 
1994 saw production rise to 426 000 oz, of which 330 000 oz came from South Africa, 
80 000 oz from Russia, 15 000 oz from North America and 1 000 oz from other producers 
(Table 1.3). In 1994, autocatalyst demand increased to 379 000 oz, of which 36 000 oz was 
sourced from recycling. The glass fabrication industry increased its demand to 14 000 oz, up 
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from only 3 000 oz the previous year. The other sectors each increased their demand slightly. 
Total demand was 386 000 oz against a dramatic increase in supply, mainly by South Africa, 
of 426 000 oz. Some 40 000 oz were taken up by stockpiles (Table 1.3). 
Production and supply from South Africa further increased during 1995. 342 000 oz were 
supplied by South Africa and 80 000 oz by Russia. North American supply dropped slightly to 
13 000 oz, probably reflecting the expansion problem encountered at- Stillwater. Other 
pr~duction remained static at 1 000 oz. 
TABLE 1.3 
Rhodium Supply and Demand 1993-1996 ('000 OZ) 
SUPPLY 1993 1994 1995 1996 
South Africa 278 330 342 355 
Russia 80 80 80 90 
North America 17 15 13 16 
Others 1 1 1 2 
Total supply 376 426 436 463 
DEMAND 
... 
. '-" 
Autocatalysts gross: 356 379 450 405 
recovery: -26 -36 -39 -47 
Chemical 11 10 13 17 
Electrical 9 8 8 7 
Glass 3 14 17 28 
Other 12 11 10 9 
Total Demand 365 386 459 419 
Movement in Stocks 11 40 -23 44 
(After Johnson Matthey, 1996) 
The South African figure of 342 000 oz for 1995 reflects sales rather than production. With an 
average market price at a 22 year low, the South African producers, it is believed, sold only 
what contractual agreements required and stockpiled the remainder as they are prone to do 
(Vermaak, 1995). It is estimated that any production in excess of contractual sales may have 
been stockpiled, awaiting price improvements. 
A major reversal of this situation occurred in 1995, with demand exceeding supply by 23 000 
oz (Table l.3). This probably reflects the stockpiling of Rh by South African producers 
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mentioned previously. Autocatalyst off-take increased further to 450 000 oz with only 39 000 
oz of this being sourced from recycling. The glass sector continued to grow, taking 17 000 oz 
and 13 000 oz being taken up by the chemical sector. 
The increase in demand by the autocatalyst sector was in response to tighter emission 
requirements in North America as well as increased manufacturing levels in the automobile 
industry in SE Asia. The fact that Rh was at a 22-year low probably boosted-sales. The other 
in~ustrial demand increases were due more to thrifting than a real increase in PGM demand. In 
the early 1990's many industrial Rh applications were substituted by Pt due to its lower price 
and similar physical characteristics. However, Pt is not as hard wearing as Rh and as these Pt 
parts needed to be replaced, Rh was once again used in preference to Pt due to its then current 
lower price. Obviously this occurs at the expense of Pt. 
1996 will see primary Rh production (sales) rise to ± 463 000 oz, with the South African 
producers possibly selling just enough to fulfil contractual obligations, and stockpiling the 
remainder. Russian output is expected to increase slightly to 90 000 oz, while North American 
supply will increase slightly to ± 16 000 oz as the expansion at Stillwater nears completion. 
Other output will increase to 1 000-2 000 oz with production from Hartley being included 
here. 
During the period 1993-1996, Russia has dramatically increased its sales of both Pt -and Pd, 
but not Rh. This can be interpreted in one of two ways: either their increased sales of Rh 
during the 1988-1991 period, when Rh was highly priced, exhausted their Rh stockpile or, 
they feel that current spot market prices are too low to justifY such continued sales. Indeed, 
were more Rh to be put on the market it would further depress the price. In light of this, it is 
difficult to explain Russia's decision to increase Rh sales at this point in time, unless the 
additional sales were sourced from recycled material, which is discussed below. 
Demand for Rh will continue to grow in 1996, driven by the current low price, and tighter 
emission control regulations, especially on heavy diesel vehicles. Since 1988, ±140 000 oz of 
Rh have gone into stockpiles (excluding the stock currently held by South African producers) 
and only 47 000 oz have been drawn down from those stockpiles, giving a net current stock of 
93000 oz. However, some of this may have been used by Japanese end-users over the last few 
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years. Despite this there could be 50 000-60 000 oz of Rh available to the market, over and 
above supply. The fall in Rh demand, down from 459 000 oz in 1995 to 419 000 oz in 1996, 
with 44 000 oz going into stocks will no doubt. further depress the Rh price. The only real 
growth in this sector will be the auto catalyst sector that requires a minimum amount of Rh in 
the catalysts to deal with diesel emissions. 
1.6 PGMPrices r- -
An analysis of the Pt price through time (Figure 1.1) demonstrates a number of interesting 
points. The data is plotted in constant 1987 (US $) money terms. The evident price cycle 
period for Pt is in excess of 25 years and at present the Pt price is in the middle of a period of 
low price, having peaked in 1980 at $677/0z. The previous peaks were in 1920 and in 1956. 
The next peak will occur around the year 2005. 
In present money terms, Pt has traded below its averag·e price for 53 of the 85 years for which 
data is available, and in fact, it has declined for 39 of those years. Although Pt traded for in 
excess of$100/0z in 1917, Pt has only reached triple figures (US $) for 39 of the 85 years. In 
1910, the Pt price was $31/0z, the same as it was in 1933. In 1945 the Pt price was $35/0z. 
Russia (Soviet Union) has dumped Pt on the world market periodically since 1924. 
For no apparent reason there exists a 97% positive correlation between the spot market price 
of gold and platinum (Figure 1.2) especially since 1975 (Figure 1.2.1). "No apparent reason" 
needs some explanation: Pt production is one-twentieth that of gold; there are a small number 
of Pt producers (93.8% of Pt was produced by South Africa and Russia between 1982 and 
1994); Pt is more difficult to mine and refine than gold, leading to much longer pipelines than 
for gold; PGM have more unique applications than gold, both as precious and industrial metals 
(Vermaak, 1995). However, Vermaak (1995) points out that there is indeed a very good 
reason why this correlation should exist: the same institutions, and indeed the same 
individuals, who set the gold price in London twice a day also set the platinum and palladium 
price. These institutions are known as the "Club of Five" and are made up of Rothschild & 
Sons, Mocatta & Goldschmid, Sharps Pixley, Samual Montague, and Mase-Westpac. 
Mase-Westpac replaced Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd in 1984. 
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Although the Pt and Pd prices are supposed to be determined according to balance of supply 
and demand, it is easy to imagine that the gold price can influence-'"this in the minds of the 
people who actually set the prices, in disregard of the fundamentals applicable to Pt and Pd at 
that moment in time. Indeed, that appears to have been the case in 1993, when. speculators, 
~~ . 
George Soros and Sir James Goldsmith, drove the gold price up by pur~~asing massive 
amounts of gold bullion, and Pt and Pd rose in sympathy with it despite the market 
fundamentals being completely differ.ent at the time. Vermaak (1995) U.9t~s that there is a 
good inverse relationship between the gold (and therefore platinum) price and rhodium price. 
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This is felt to reflect true market fundamentals of Rh. If the PtJPd prices are high, Pt and Pd 
production will be increased, which in turn will de facto cause an increase in the Rh supply. As 
the applications (market) for Rh are much more limited than for either Pt or Pd, the Rh market 
price is much more sensitive to oversupply (and shortages) and therefore the price will drop. 
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In general terms, it is safe to assume that Pt (and Pd) will follow the gold price, usually trading 
at a slight premium to gold, in the absence of any real fundamental issues. When there are real 
fundamental issues, Pt should trade at prices refle~ing these. 
As in other mineral mining sectors, there is a strong and growing belief in the PGM sector that 
there exists a "conspiracy" that somehow controls the PGM metal prices. Different lines of 
"evidence" are cited to support this "theory". An examination of PGM matte valuation prices 
(in constant Rand terms) reveals that they have remained static, or decreased slightly over the 
past six years. This would seem to suggest that the price is managed in Rand terms. No real 
benefit of the recent RandIDollar depreciation has filtered through to the South African PGM 
mining industry during 1996, due to synchronous drops in the metal Dollar prices. Another 
argument used is the continued willingness of major PGM refiners and fabricators (Johnson 
Matthey and Engelhard) to purchase all and any PGM's produced, which has, it is widely 
believed, been formalized in the form of contractual agreements. 
Another factor in this argument is the manipulation of information on the part of these two 
" 
refiners and fabricators. A sizeable proportion of Russian sales is in fact from recycled scrap 
material, which is toll refined by the Russian Krasnoyarsk Refinery for Johnson Matthey and 
Engelhard. This recycled PGM is reported under Russian sales rather than under autocatalyst 
recovery data. The auto catalyst recovery data that is reported accounts only for material 
recovered in North America and western Europe. 
Sizeable inventories of old Russian PGM's are held by various concerns (banks and 
fabricators) in Switzerland and Japan. The movement of this stock, when sold and moved from 
one institution to another, is reported as "Russian sales". These factors have the effect of 
making the Russian sales appear to be much larger that they actually are. The Russian 
suppliers obviously are happy to go along with this illusion, as it appears to "give them 
considerable sway in the market place. Like the South African producers, they prefer to reveal 
as little information as possible about their production. In fact, all information about Russian 
PGM production and sales is classified as a state secret, by right of a Presidential decree. 
Another artificial factor in the reporting mechanism is that of reporting Investment bullion 
sales under the heading of Demand. Investors merely hold stocks, on a speculative basis, and 
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these stocks are readily available to the market when the criteria of the "investor" are met by 
the market place. To include investment purchases in demand data distorts the total analysis by 
making the balance between the amount of new metal supply entering the market and 
"demand" always seem close to each other. -< 
George Soros and Sir James Goldsmith were able to manipulate the gold price in 1993, 
despite the plethora of producers and abundant stocks held world-wide,r ana indeed George 
SQfOS in currently driving the value of the French Franc downwards at a dizzying pace. His 
motives are best known only to himself, but no doubt there is a strong profit motive involved. 
So perhaps there is some shred of truth or reality in the conspiracy theory as far as the PGM 
market is concerned. 
In 1993, the average Pt price was $374/oz (Figure 1.3) with trading taking place within the 
range of $350-$403/oz. There was little price movement over the 1992 price, despite 
increased demand, as supply was also up, as discussed earlier. The average Pd price in 1993 
increased by 39% over the 1992 price. However, rather than just following the Pt price as it is 
prone to, this price rise was driven by market fundamentals as well. In 1993, supply and 
demand were well matched, there being only 15 000 oz surplus, due to massive rise in Pd 
utilization in the electronics sector. Rhodium continues its long slide downwards due, once 
again, to market fundamentals: oversupply and limited applications. Rh traded at an average 
price of$1 133/oz in 1993, down from $2 478/oz in 1992. 
Platinum continued its slow recovery during 1994, trading at an average price of $405/oz for 
the year. It reached a high of $419 in October 1994 but the price eased for the last three 
months of the year, as it tends to. Pd increased in price steadily in the first nine months of 
1994, thereafter seeming to lose direction once again in the last three months. 
The average price was $142/oz, having reached a high in November of $156/oz. Again the 
price was driven by strong demand, especially in the electronics sector. Rh continued to lose 
ground in 1994, trading at an average of only $743/oz in the face of oversupply. 
1995 saw the Pt price rise to its highest level since 1990, reaching $460/oz in trading in late 
March - early April, but the average price rose to just $424/oz. Once again, and this is a 
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common feature of the Pt price, the price softened in the last three months of the year, the 
market seeming to lack direction. The early part of 1995 saw the collapse of the Mexican Peso 
and "Emerging Markets" sought refuge in precio~s metals pushing the Pt price up. Palladium 
continued its increase in price, although at a-<slower rate. The average price for 1995 was 
$151/0z, having reached a high of$178 in April. However, with continued massive shipments 
from Russia, the price declined to a 21 month low of $ 127/0z by the end of the year. Rhodium 
continued its downward spiral, halving its value to an average of $440/0z Tor ""the year. During 
A1!gUst it fell below the level of Pt for the first time in over ten years. By December 1995 it 
had reached a 22 year low of$260/0z, despite being in short supply in the market (Table 1.3). 
Early 1996 saw the Pt price remain fairly strong, trading between $400-$420/0z. However, 
since then it has declined to below $400/0z and is currently trading at $380-$390/0z. In the 
latter part of 1996 it has followed the fortunes of gold very closely, although the fact that Pt 
will once again be in oversupply this year provides fundamental reasons for this. Palladium has 
also suffered in 1996, with the average price dropping to $129/0z. This is, it is believed, more 
in sympathy with the falling Pt price than real fundamentals. With Russian shipments- for the 
year expected to be approximately 3.8 Moz, and modest increases in demand, Pd should be in 
short supply, and obviously the price should increase. This is not happening and therefore the 
belief that it is the gold price that is driving the Pd price at present rather than real market 
fundamentals. This will undoubtedly have a marked effect on the price early in the new year, 
when the Pd price is expected to better reflect the balance of supply and demand. 
1.7 The Future 
Price prediction is, even at the best of times, a very dangerous occupation. These are not the 
best of times, and so, predictions will be attempted only in gross terms. Until the Russian 
stockpiles have been exhausted, the fundamentals for Pt look poor, especially in the face of 
declining demand. In the absence of market fundamentals, it would appear that Pt will follow 
the fortunes of gold in the short term. This was clearly demonstrated in OctoberlNovember 
1996, when the gold price began a dramatic drop in value, when the International Monetary 
Fund announced that it would be selling ±500t of gold and the Swiss Reserve Bank announced 
its intention to reduce its reserves of gold. The gold price fell below $370/0z at a time of year 
when it has traditionally strengthened, due to demand for jewellery over the Christmas period. 
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Early January 1997 saw the gold price predicted to fall to as little as $330/0z within the 
coming twelve months. The price of Pt, Pd and Rh all followed the downward trend set by 
gold, although there does not appear to be any re~l fundamental reason for them to have done 
so at this time. However, if the analysis of tlte -·history of the Pt prices is correct, Pt prices 
should peak early in the next century, around 2005 (Figure 1.3) when the next 25 year cycle 
peak is due. This is very tentative, and given recent performances, this upswing may never 
materialize. 
Palladium, on the other hand, appears to be undergoing a dramatic increase in demand, in both 
the auto catalyst and electronics sectors, which will continue, provided that the price does not 
rise above about $170/0z. Above this level, the electronics sector will probably substitute Pd 
with base metals. This is a real threat, as practical problems of high temperature firing of 
ceramics (silicone chips) using base metals, such as nickel and silver, have been overcome. 
With increasingly stringent anti-pollution legislation being brought into force in North 
America, Europe, South America, South Eas~ Asia and Australia, the demand for Pd is 
assured to grow. However, so too is recovery from recycling, as the PGM's are virtually 
indestructible (Vermaak, 1995). As the clean-air legislation is expanded to include diesel 
powered vehicles, the demand for Rh will also increase. Because the Rh loading is so small in 
these types of catalytic converters, Rh may still find itselfin oversupply. Intuitively, due to the 
rarity of Rh, it is felt that Rh should trade at a small premium to Pt. That this will be achieved 
in the short to medium term is unlikely. Rh will, in all likelihood, continue to trade at a price 
lower than Pt until demand increases and outstrips supply once again. 
One of the greatest single influences on PGM prices is that of supply from Russia. Russia, as 
noted earlier, does not make data about their production and stockpiles available. However, 
estimates (Forrest, 1995) indicate that Russia may only have 1.88 Moz ofPt left in stockpiles. 
At the rate that Russia has been drawing down this inventory, in the region of 500 000 to 
700000 oz per annum, this could be exhausted in three years (i.e. by the year 2000). This will 
put demand in excess of supply by as much as 300 000 oz, discounting the investment sector, 
at current production capacity. The recent announcements by South African producers in 
terms of planned increased production may be able to cover this deficit. Supply and demand 
are expected to be fairly closely matched, but the price of Pt will probably rise, as fabricators 
build stocks to protect themselves in the short to medium term. 
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Russian stocks ofPd, on the other hand, are estimated to be nearly 10.0 Moz (Forrest, 1996). 
If Russia continues to sell Pd at rates comparable to recent years, this inventory could be 
completely depleted in five to six years. 
At current production levels, it is unlikely that the NNe is contributing any new metal to 
inventories in stockpiles. It is also not known what proportion of Russian sales is sourced from 
recycled material supplied to them from the west. The Russians woutd Obviously like to 
deplete their Pd stockpiles without affecting the Pd price too much, but also without 
precipitating substitution. The Pd price will therefore remain fairly static in real terms over the 
next five to six years. Once Russian stockpiles are depleted, there will be a substantial shortfall 
of Pd in the market, probably driving prices up. Some of this shortfall will be met by South 
African production, which will increase as Pt production is increased. The extent to which this 
will occur will be dictated to some extent, by where_ that expansion takes place, through 
increased Merensky or UG2 production. As much of the expansion will be within the Amplats 
Group, and specifically at PPRust, it is unlikely that South African production will be able to 
meet this shortfall, which could be as much as 1.5 Moz per annum. This will present awindow 
of opportunity to the North American producers, and possibly boost exploration for Pd-rich 
deposits everywhere. 
The increase in production in South Africa to meet the Pt supply towards the end of this 
century, will no doubt create a considerable oversupply of Rh. No real growth is expected in 
Rh demand, and this oversupply will further depress prices, possibly even below current levels 
in real terms. Russian stocks of Rh are unknown and it is thought that Russian Rh sales 
probably represent current production. A significant change in Russian sales is therefore felt to 
be unlikely. 
1.7.1 Conclusions 
This market summary has attempted to outline the problems faced by PGM producers as far as 
the market is concerned. Static or declining metal prices, when viewed against the rising 
production costs in the South African PGM industry, which are beyond the scope of this work 
but nonetheless very real, means that the profitability of the industry is being eroded at an 
alarming rate. The short- to medium-term market for PGM's looks bleak. Current metal prices 
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severely restrict the profitability of PGM producers in South Africa and is requiring them to 
examine alternatives to address short- to medium-term production problems or "windows of 
oppOrtunityll presented by overcapacity in proces~ing plants. It is against this background that 
the remainder of this work will examine the-'potential of small-scale open cast· mining of, 
specifically but not exclusively, the UG2 in the western Bushveld Complex. 
1.8 The Bushveld Complex 
The Bushveld Complex (BC) is the largest known layered complex in the world, occupying 
some 60000 km2 mainly in the Northern and North West Provinces of South Africa. It extends 
for 370 km in an east-west direction and 365 km NW-SE. The total thickness of the BC is 
some 7500m. The BC consists of a series of interconnected (at depth) lobes or compartments, 
which were probably originally connected to a deep magma chamber (Sharpe & Snyman, 
1980) of which five have been recognized. The most important of these from a PGM supply 
point of view are the eastern lobe, the western lo~e and· the northern lobe or Potgietersrus lobe 
(Figure 1.4). 
The extrusion of large volumes of basaltic and felsic magmas marked the event that gave rise 
to the BC. The basaltic magmas formed the Dullstroom volcanics and the felsic magmas gave 
rise to the Rooiberg felsites, towards the end of the Transvaal sequence sedimentation. The 
Transvaal sediments were intruded by a series of pre-Bushveld sills and then by the mafic 
rocks of the BC (Vermaak, 1995). 
The mafic magma spread upwards and outwards, probably following low-angled fractures and 
weaknesses (Sharpe & Snyman, 1980). This formed a series of seven shallow, overlapping 
cone-shaped intrusions, which enlarged with the introduction of more magma from depth into 
the system, producing the lobes of the BC as they exist today (Figure 1.4). The layering in the 
three main lobes, the western lobe, the eastern lobe and the Potgietersrus lobe, is essentially 
similar, especially the upper Critical and the Main Zones (Vermaak, 1995). 
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1.9 Stratigraphy of the Bushveld Complex 
The BC is subdivided into three suites; the Rustenburg Layered Suite (RLS), the Rashoop 
Granophyre Suite (RGS) and the Lebowa Gt;~te Suite (LGS) (Tasble 1.4). The BC was 
emplaced into the Transvaal sequence, a 12km thick volcano-sedimentary sequence of rock 
within the Kaapvaal Craton. Both the Transvaal Basin, in which the Transvaal sequence were 
accumulating, and the BC are thought to be genetically related to the Ventersdorp Rift 
architecture (Clendinin et aI., 1988) and associated mantle plume (Houseman, 1990) 
respectively. 
Unfortunately, an in-depth description and discussion of the BC is beyond the scope of this 
work and this section is only intended to introduce the reader in broad terms to the geology of 
the Rustenburg Layered Suite, specifically in the western BC lobe (Figure 1.5). A detailed 
review of the BC is provided by Eales et al. (1993) and Von Gruenewaldt et al. (1985). The 
stratigraphy is discussed with special emphasis on the- UG2 Chromitite layer. The Merensky 
Reef is also described briefly. 
The stratigraphy of the BC resembles that of other layered complexes, and is remarkably 
consistent within and between the various lobes of the complex. Individual layers in the RLS 
can be traced for tens of kilometres within lobes, and can be correlated between lobes, e.g. the 
Merensky Reef and the UG2. The BC displays discordant and pseudo-concordant 
relationships with the Transvaal sequence (Sharpe & Snyman, 1980). 
1.10 The Rustenburg Layered Suite 
The RLS contains the platiniferous layers of the BC, and this section will concentrate, for this 
reason, on the RLS. The RLS (Table 1.4), composed of the mafic and ultramafic phases ofthe 
BC, has been dated at 2050 ± 22 Ma (von Gruenewaldt et aI., 1985), and more recently at 
2025 ± 40 Ma (Lee & Butcher, 1990). Both the Formal and Informal subdivisions of the RLS 
are presented in Table 1.4. More detailed work on the RLS in the western Bushveld Complex 
is provided by Eales et al. (1994) and Maier & Walters (1994). 
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TABLE 1.4 
Formal Subdivision Age (Ma) Informal 
-:, -. Subdivision 
Bushveld Lebowa Makhutso Granite 1670 ±30 
Complex Granite UlPb Bushveld Granite Nebo Granite 2010 ±20 
Suite UlPb 
Rashoop Stavoren Granophyre 2000 ±30 Bushveld 
Granophyre UlPb Granophyre 
-
Suite 
subzone C 
Luipershoek Olivine Diorite Upper Zone: subzone B Ironstone Magnetite Gabbro 
Magnet Heights Gabbronorite subzone A 
Mapoch Gabbronorite subzone C 
Leolo Mountain Gabbronorite Main Zone: subzone B 
Rustenburg Winnaarshoek Norite-Anorthosite 2050 ±22 subzone A 
Layered Rb/Sr 
Suite Winterveld Norite-Anorthosite Critical subzone B 
Zwartkoppies Pyroxenite Zone: subzone A 
Serokolo Bronzitite subzoneD 
Jagdlust Harzburgite Lower Zone: subzone C 
Rostock Bronzitite $.ubzone B 
' -' 
Clapham Bronzitite subzone A 
Marginal Zone: 
Shelter Norite 
Marico Maruleng type 
Diabase ;::::2050 Lydenburg type __ 
Suite ~224 
Transvaal Rooiberg 
Sequence Felsite Selonsrivier Formation No reliable Rooiberg Felsite Damwal Formation Data Group 
Subdivision and Chronological Framework of the Bushveld Complex. 
(After Vermaak & Von Gruenewaldt, 1986) 
1.10.1 The Marginal Zone 
The Marginal Zone (Shelter Norite) consists of chilled pyroxenitic and noritic rocks. The 
marginal rocks of the BC are thought to be both pre- and syn-Bushveld sills and form the floor 
of the complex (von Gruenewaldt, 1985). The pre-Bushveld sills are thought to give the best 
estimate of the composition of the parental magma of the RSL (Hatton & Sharpe, 1983). This 
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represents a critical step in understanding the Lower Zone, as the parental magma of the 
Lower Zone is boninitic in composition. This boninitic magma is believed to have played a 
major role in the formation of chromitite and PGE-mineralization within the RLS (Hatton & 
Sharpe, 1983). -< ". 
The Marginal Zone rocks consist of norites and some quench-textured micro-orthopyroxenites 
(Sharpe & Hulbert, 1985) which enclose xenoliths of (now meta-) sedimentary and some mafic 
ro2ks, and form a 50-200 m thick sequence. 
The boninitic composition of these rocks is confirmed by their enrichment in Zr, Rb and K20 
and high Si02 and MgO values. The importance of the presence of these boninitic rocks is 
seen to be twofold: firstly, the B1 boninites (Hatton & Sharpe, 1983) are thought to be "the 
best available representatives of the magma that gave rise to the Lower Zone and other 
pyroxenitic rocks of the Bushveld Complex". The pyroxenitic rocks are inevitably associated 
with chromitite and PGE mineralization in the RLS and-the B1 magma is seen as the source of 
both the PGE and Cr in these layers. Secondly, the B 1 boninites of the BC, being very similar 
.-
to B 1 boninites elsewhere, infer that they were formed in a subduction-related setting (Hatton 
& Sharpe, 1983). 
1.10.2 The Lower Zone (LZ) 
The Lower Zone is ±1700 m thick and divided into 4 subzones (A-D) (Cameron, 1978). It is 
best known from the eastern BC, where it crops out. The LZ consists mainly of dunites, 
harzburgites and orthopyroxenites (Figure 1.6). The Clapham and Rostock Bronzitites 
(subzone A & B of the Lower Zone) form a major (400 m thick) unit. This is overlain by the 
Jagdlust Harzburgite, (subzone C of the Lower Zone). The contact between these two 
subzones is taken to be the first appearance of cumulus olivine. The harzburgite subzone 
consists of a series of cyclical units: massive dunites followed by harzburgites. Intercumulus 
orthopyroxene (bronzite) increases upwards forming oikocrysts (Cameron, 1978). The 
layering within this sequence is well developed. The harzburgite subzone is followed, 
gradationally, by the upper Serokolo Bronzitite (subzone D of the Lower Zone). In the eastern 
BC this is considered to be part of the Lower Zone, but part of the lower Critical Zone in the 
western BC (Eales et aI., 1990). 
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However, the transition from LZ to ICZ in the eastern BC is marked by ±30 m of bronzitite 
containing layers offeldspathic bronzitite (Cameron, 1978). Generally, the first appearance of 
cumulate chromite defines the base of the ICZ. 
1.10.3 The Critical Zone (CZ) 
The Critical Zone (CZ) is subdivided into two subzones, namely the lower CZ (lCZ) and the 
upper CZ (uCZ) which correspond with the Zwartkoppies Pyroxenite and the Wintersveld 
Norite-Anorthosite respectively (Table 1.4). Traditionally the boundary between these two 
subzones has been taken to be the first appearance of cumulus plagioclase and chromite. 
However, it has been demonstrated (Teigler et aI., 1992) that this is not valid in the 
south-westward extension of the western lobe of the BC. In that part of the lobe abundant 
cumulus plagioclase is present in the ICZ. It has been suggested by Eales et al., (1993) that 
either the norite or anorthosite layer occurring between the MG2 and MG3 chromitite layers 
would less ambiguously define the boundary between the ICZ and the uCZ. 
1.10.3.1 Lower Critical Zone (ICZ) 
The lithologies of the ICZ are feldspathic pyroxenites, harzburzites, minor dunites and 
chromitites (Figure l.6). The chromitite layers vary in thickness from <lcm to the ± 1,2 m 
thick LG6 Chromitite layer. In general, the succession of the ICZ lacks the -cyclical 
crystallization pattern present in the Lower Zone. Furthermore, the presence of dunites and 
harzburgites (present in places in the eastern BC) in the middle of the succession indicate 
reversals in the normal fractionation trend. The majority of chromitite layers are interlayered 
with pyroxenites or anorthosites and less commonly with norites, in the eastern sector of the 
BC (Cameron & Desborough, 1964). 
The base of the ICZ has been re-defined by Eales et aI., (1990) for the western sector of the 
BC, as being the base of the thick package of orthopyroxenites in which the LG Chromitites 
are found. Traditionally the uCZ/lCZ boundary has been taken to be the first appearance of 
cumulus plagioclase. 
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1.10.3.2 Upper Critical Zone 
The upper Critical Zone is marked by; the reappearance of olivine (after an absence of ±500m) 
in the ultramafic rocks; by the appearance of chromitite layers with sharp bottom contacts 
which are interlayered with anorthosites and/or anorthositic rocks (Figure 1.6); the most 
complete cyclic units known in the BC and the most evolved chromitites in the whole 
succession which are also sulfide bearing, and frequently platiniferous. The top of the uCZ is 
currently under debate, with some workers preferring the upper Giant Mottled Anorthosite 
(de Klerk, 1991; Eales et al., 1993) and others placing it at the base of the Merensky Reef 
(Kruger, 1990). However, most workers prefer the use of the former, as the latter relies on the 
absence of the Giant Mottled Anorthosite in conjunction with the unconformity at the base of 
the Merensky Reef The uCZ contains the Merensky Reef, Platreef and UG2 layers; the main 
platiniferous ore bodies of the BC. For more detailed description ofthe cumulate succession of 
the uCZ, as well as geochemical trends and their interpretation the reader is referred to Teigler 
et al. (1992), Eales et al. (1994) and Maier & Eales (1994). 
1.10.3.2.1 The UG2 Chromitite Layer: 
The UG2 is one of three important chromitite layers that lie within the uCZ. The other 
significant chromitite layers are the UG 1 and a third chromitite layer is present in the eastern 
BC, designated the UG3 Chromitite (McLaren & De Villiers, 1982). The UG2 is the only one 
of these three chromitites that contains economic PGM mineralization. Apart from breaks 
created by the "Northern Gaps" north of the Pilanesberg and the Brits graben, where the entire 
RLS is disturbed by faulting, the UG2 in the western Bushveld Complex is traceable for 
extensive strike distances, of 50km or more. The UG2 in the eastern Bushveld Complex is 
similarly traceable along almost the entire strike length, except where it is interrupted by the 
Steelpoort and W onderkop faults 
The UG2 represents an incomplete cyclic unit, and the PGE-mineralization is mainly confined 
to the chromitite and the top of the underlying footwall unit. Although the UG2 shows 
enrichment of sulfides over its enclosing layers, its tenor is usually quite low, an order of 
magnitude lower than the Merensky Reef In the north-west sector of the western lobe of the 
BC, the Merensky Reef and the UG2 are separated by between ±15m and ±370m of 
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intervening cumulates (Table 1.5). The UG2 varies in thickness between ±15cm and ±255cm 
and dips towards the centre of the complex at between 5° and 70° (Table 1.5). 
Thickness (cm) 
U,G2-MRPX (m) 
Dip 
Tabl'e·l.5 
Western Bushveld Complex Eastern Bushveld Complex 
North South Northwest Central 
90 to 155 15 to 255 ? 60 to 140 
15 to 150 85 to 220 ±240 305 to 370 
15° to 30° 8° to 28° 55° to 70° SO to 25° 
Geologic Data on the UG2 Chromitite Layer 
(After McLaren & De Villiers, 1982) 
South 
90 to 220 
±145 
6° to 45° 
The UG2 lies at the base of a ± 10m-thick feldspathic pyroxenite layer within the anorthositic 
subzone of the upper Critical Zone (Winterveld Norite-Anorthosite). The UG2 can be massive 
or it can contain intercalated layers of pyroxenite, increasing the overall thickness of the unit 
to up to 5.7m (McLaren & De Villiers, 1982). In the southeastern sector of the western 
Bushveld Complex these intercalations can also be anorthosite or norite rather than 
pyroxenite. 
The UG2 is composed of chromite (60-90% by volume), orthopyroxene (5-25%), plagioclase 
(5-15%) as well as accessory amounts of other minerals, of which the more important are 
clinopyroxene, base metal and other sulfides, platinum-group minerals, ilmenite and magnetite 
(McLaren & De Villiers, 1982). The UG2 frequently has a mottled appearance due to the 
presence of large (2-5cm) poikilitic bronzite crystals enclosing numerous small chromite 
crystals (Leeb-du Toit, 1986). 
The average PGM+Au tenor of the UG2 is 7.0 glt. There is a lateral as well as a vertical 
variation in both the tenor and chemistry of the PGM mineralization in the UG2. It invariably 
shows enrichment ofPGM+Au at the bottom contact and usually has one or more PGM peaks 
in the middle or towards the top of the layer (McLaren & De Villiers, 1982). The PGM grade 
in the bottom contact can frequently exceed 20 glt and high grades are present for several 
centimetres into the footwall, where the footwall is a pegmatoid. This is an important 
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consideration in open cast mining as it is imperative that the bottom contact and some footwall 
be extracted to maximise the grade of the ore. However, the amount of footwall that is 
mineralized is highly variable and requires care~l control. The majority of the PGM occurs 
along grain boundaries or associated with interstitial sulfides with a small proportion enclosed 
in chromite or silicates (McLaren & De Villiers, 1982; von Gruenewaldt, 1979). 
The UG2 is usually directly underlain by a pegmatoidal feldspathic· pyroxenite, often 
indistinguishable from Merensky pegmatoid (apart from the absence of visible sulfides), locally 
known as the UG2 Pegmatoid. This contact is usually very gradational and undulose, with 
mineralization extending into the pegmatoid for a variable distance. However, at Western 
Platinum Ltd. (WPL) and Karee Mine, the UG2 is underlain over extensive areas by an 
anorthosite (mottled), which is very distinctive and probably represents the primary footwall 
rock type. The footwall contact of the UG2 and anorthosite is sharp, though undulose, and 
mineralization is rarely present in the anorthosite footwall layer. On the perimeter of this area 
the incipient replacement of this anorthositic footwall has been observed, where a rapid change 
in footwall rock type occurs (often over less than 3m) from anorthosite to pegmatoid. On 
EPL, extensive areas of UG2 overlies a rhythmically layered norite. The contact between the 
UG2 and the footwall is a disconformity. In these areas the footwall layering is truncated by 
the UG2. It is believed that this contact is erosional, and represents the effects of the surge of 
new magma into the compartment. The absence of the UG2 pegmatoid is interpreted by 
Leeb-du Toit (op cit.) to be indicative of pot holing. This is, however, not the case on EPL. 
The UG2 contains the highest concentration of sulfides of any of the chromitite layers of the 
Be. The base metal sulfides are mainly pentlandite, pyrrhotite, pyrite and chalcopyrite and 
there are a host of noble metal sulfides, many of which are unnamed, as well as intermetalloids 
and solid solutions (electrum) (von Gruenewaldt, 1979). 
The UG2 usually has a clear, sharp top contact and is overlain by a medium grained 
feldspathic pyroxenite. Within this hanging wall unit are usually present a series of chromite 
layers, known variously as the "Leaders", "Triplets" or "Marker". The distance from the top 
contact of the UG2 to these chromitite layers is highly variable over short distances and they 
are frequently seen to bifurcate from the main chromitite layer and rejoin it. Above the 
feldspathic pyroxenite the UG2 cyclic unit grades into a norite, followed by anorthosites 
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(Figure 1.6). On EPL the UG2 hanging wall pyroxenite is overlain by a thick sequence (±20m) 
of spotted and mottled anorthosites. 
There is a substantial amount of descriptive'work published on the UG2 in the western 
Bushveld Complex to which the reader is referred; Viljoen et al. (1986a); Viljoen et al. 
(1986b); Leeb-du Toit, (1986); Viljoen & Hieber, (1986) and Farquhar, (1986). Mossom, 
(1986) and Gain (1980 & 1985) provide descriptions of the UG2 in the eastern Bushveld 
Complex. The mineralization of the UG2 is discussed by Naldrett (1989) and McLaren & De 
Villiers (op. cit.) 
Like the Merensky, the UG2 displays slumping structures known as potholes which affect the 
normal elevation of the UG2 due to "removal" ofa portion of the footwall stratigraphy. These 
features are interpreted to be due to layer-parallel extensional slip (Carr et aI., 1994). Potholes 
are disruptive to mining and can cause considerable losses of mineable ore. They are known to 
occur also in the Merensky, where their origin and mode of formation has been debated since 
the late 1950's, in the LG and MG chromitite layers as well as the magnetite layers of the Main 
Zone. They are also described in the Stillwater Layered Complex (Mooney, 1995). 
1.10.3.2.2 The Merensky Reef: 
The Merensky occurs within a differentially graded cycle known as the Merensky Cyclic unit. 
The term Merensky Reef is unfortunate as it simplifies what is a very complex ore body. It is 
not a "reef' in any sense. Von Gruenewaldt (1979) expanded Vermaak & Hendriks' (1976) 
definition of the Merensky Reef as the basal pyroxenitic portion of the Merensky cyclic unit, 
including the porphyritic pyroxenite, the pegmatoidal pyroxenite and the associated chromitite 
stringers that may be developed. This essentially defines the Merensky Reef as that portion of 
the Merensky cyclic unit that hosts the PGM mineralization and it shows great lateral variation 
in style. It ranges from a thin «50cm) pegmatoidal feldspathic pyroxenite, bounded top and 
bottom by thin chromitite layers, to a medium grained feldspathic pyroxenite 5m to 7m thick. 
Several distinct facies of Mer en sky Reef are recognized (Vermaak, 1976; Davey, 1993). 
Generally, the Merensky "Reef' is used to describe that portion of the Merensky pyroxenite 
that is economically important. The economically important portion of the Merensky is 
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invariably associated with one or more thin chromitite layers and the development of at least 
some pegmatoidal material. How well this pegmatoid is developed can vary greatly, both on 
the scale of the lobe and on the scale of a mine, or even an individual stope. Peak PGM values 
are invariably associated with the chromitite layers. It appears that the PGM tenor, measured 
in terms of grams per unit area, is surprisingly constant throughout the western BC. This being 
the case, the thinner the Merensky "Reef', the higher the grade per ton. The PGM 
mineralization in the Merensky is essentially cryptic. Where the MerensKY pyroxenite is thin, 
the footwall rocks are often mineralized to economic grade. The mineralization appears to 
migrate upwards, becoming more diffuse, as the Merensky becomes progressively thicker 
towards the east. Despite this, peak PGM grades are still associated with the basal chromitite 
layer, where it is present. 
The hanging wall rocks of the Merensky Reef are essentially anorthosites and overlying these 
is the Bastard Merensky Pyroxenite (Figure 1.6), which in places closely resembles the 
Merensky pyroxenite but often presents as a leuconorite. The Bastard Merensky is the last 
cyclic unit of the uCZ. The footwall sequence of the Merensky consists of a series of 
anorthosites and norites (Figure 1.6). The layering is well developed and quite distinct in these 
rocks, with individual layers ("markers") traceable over more than 50km along strike. 
1.10.4 The Main Zone (MZ) 
The base of the Main Zone is generally accepted as being the top of the Giant Mottled 
Anorthosite (Figure 1.6). Mineralogically it is marked by the loss of olivine and chromite and 
the appearance of augite and inverted-pigeonite. Lithologically it consists of norites and 
gabbro-norites but has anorthositic layers close to its base and at the top of the MZ. It is 
subdivided into 3 subzones. Pyroxenites are rare but present. The main pyroxenite "Marker" is 
used to mark the transition from subzone B to C (Leolo Mountain Gabbronorite to the 
Mapoch Gabbronorite, Table 1.4). This pyroxenite is significant in that it marks the 
rejuvenation of the whole-rock compositions, indicating a possible influx of new magma. 
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1.10.5 The Upper Zone (UZ) 
The Upper Zone is defined mineralogically by the first appearance of magnetite as a cumulus 
phase, above the pyroxenite marker. Lithologically it consists of a series of magnetite layers, 
magnetite gabbros, anorthosites and ferro diorites. Once again, the UZ is subdivided into 3 
subzones A, B and C (Table 1.4). The base of subzone B (Ironstone Magnetite Gabbro) is 
defined by the reappearance of olivine and that of subzone C (LuipershoeK OlIvine Diorite), by 
the appearance of apatite, as cumulus phases. The UZ is ± 2000m thick (Figure 1.6) and 
contains economically important magnetite layers. 
The following chapters will examine the history and methodology of open cast mining of the 
UG2 and compare the economics of open cast mining with underground mining as well as the 
metallurgical problems that must be overcome to profitably treat shallow UG2 ore. 
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 
- . 
2.0 Open Cast Mining for PGM's in the Bushveld Complex. 
2.1 Background: 
-
A lthough it has long been known that the chromitite layers of the Bushveld contain PGM's (Hall & Humphrey, 1908), few attempts were made to work them for their 
PGM content until the early 1980's, when Lonrho's Western Platinum Mine began 
mining the UG2. This was made possible by the development of metallurgical processes which 
overcame problems in this area that had previously marshalled against the extraction ofPGM's 
from chromitites. A secondary factor was the comparative grades of the UG2 and the 
Merensky Reef At Western Platinum, the UG2 grade is greater than that of the Merensky, 
and therein lay the attraction and driving force to overcome these metallurgical problems. 
Because of the greater areal extent of the UG2 compared to the Merensky Reef, the ability to 
exploit the UG2 would, and has, more than doubled the South African PGM resources 
(Mintek, Application Report No.1). 
2.1.1 History of Open Cast Mining of the UG2 and Merensky Reef in the 
Bushveld Complex: 
The first known open cast mining operation on the UG2 in the Bushveld Complex was at the 
Crocodile River Mine (CRM) No.1 Pit, near Brits, which began operation in 1989 (Figure 
2.1). This was followed by two more open cast operations on the farm Buffelsfontein, 
immediately south of EPL, and then one on the Latilla property, immediately to the east of 
EPL (Figure 2.1). The reason for open cast mining at the Crocodile River Mine, at that time, 
forms a recurring theme throughout the western Bushveld mines: a shortage of tonnage to 
keep the mill full because of production problems underground. CRM attempted to mine by 
trackless mining methods which were not as successful as they might have been, causing a 
slower build up of tonnage from underground than planned, and so their production fell behind 
and their mill was underutilized. 
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LOCATION PLAN OF OPEN CAST MINING OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH - EASTERN PORTION OF THE WESTERN BUSHVELD COMPLEX 
Underground development was stopped upon the purchase of the mine by Impala, and 
reserves were worked out. The mill throughput was maintained at a constant level of 
160 OOOt/month by utilizing open cast ore (Brits, pers comm., 1996). This was further 
supplemented by the purchase of shallow (0-8m) open cast ore from EPL onceEPL began 
open cast mining operations in 1990 (see Chapter 5). 
EPL began open cast operations (A-West Pit: Figure 2.1) in 1990 to supplement ore coming 
from underground. The reasons for open cast mining at that point in time were twofold: 
production problems underground providing a slower tonnage build up than had been planned 
or expected, and secondly, during the latter part of 1990, it became evident that the second 
mill stream, then under construction, would be underutilized. This led directly to the decision 
to proceed with a second open cast operation (C-West, Figure 2.1). During 1993, a similar 
situation prevailed on Karee Mine (WPL), which foresaw a drop in underground tonnage due 
to production problems related to encountering a large replacement pegmatoid body at NO.3 
Shaft. At that stage a small UG2 open cast pit was mined to supplement tonnage. 
In 1993, Western Platinum Mine too began a small UG2 open cast pit, once again in response 
to production problems underground. Unfortunately, this pit was not completed at the time, 
due to the fact that the contract mining company went into liquidation about half way through 
mining. This pit has subsequently been reopened and mining completed, late in 1996, in an 
- . 
effort to build a stockpile for the 1996 Christmas period, which traditionally suffers from a 
shortage of tonnage to mill due to mine closure over this period. 
Until recently, no one seems to have examined the possibility of mining the Merensky Reefby 
open cast methods, in response to the problems cited above. 
During 1993, RPM brought the PPRust Mine, on the Platreef, into production. It' is believed 
that RPM researched for some 15 years to overcome metallurgical problems caused by the 
complex mineralogy of the Platreef. While this has nothing to do with the UG2, and its 
complex metallurgical problems, it is believed that this, along with the industrial problems that 
Amplats have been suffering, gave the impetus to RPM to examine the available Merensky 
reserves as potential open cast operations. 
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In 1995, RPM began open cast mining operations on a ± 4 kIn long Merensky pit, at Bleskop 
(Figure 2.1) which lies to the south of the Bleskop Shaft, near Rustenburg. The Merensky 
Reef in this area is "classic" RPM type MereI).sky Reef. It is a pegmatoidal feldspathic 
pyroxenite, between 60cm and 70cm in thicKness. The average grade in the open cast 
operational area is in excess of 5.0 g/t, probably ±8.0 g/t (Harrison, pers. comm., 1996). The 
mining rate there is in the region of 50 000t-60 OOOt per month. The Merensky Reef has a 
"frozen" bottom contact, which is removed by hand if necessary, due to the high grade 
reported along that contact. Ore is loaded on the basis of a visual inspection (of sulfides?), 
although the grade control is reported to be good (Harrison,pers. comm., 1996). Mining costs 
are reported to be R44/t, down to a depth of 25 metres below surface, and the mining is 
contracted out. 
Although metallurgical recoveries are reported to be as high as 64% (Harrison, pers. comm., 
1996), it is believed that this figure is based upon bench test results. It is highly likely that 
these bench tests involved at least some of the metallurgical processes/procedures developed 
for the Platreef at PPRust. The ore is transported by rail to the main RPM milling and 
processing plant where the open cast material is blended with underground Merensky ore. 
There appears to be no attempt to batch-mill or campaign the open cast ore separately, and it 
is therefore felt unlikely that RPM are indeed obtaining such high recoveries in practice. 
An inspection of the Bleskop pit revealed the presence of deep weathering down to ± 20m 
below surface, with the Merensky Reef displaying extensive oxidation and pervasive 
development of clay minerals. Furthermore, due to the fact that is "policy" to mine through 
potholes and dykes, it is felt that the dilution is underestimated and that the mill-feed grade of 
ore sent to the mill must be substantially less than the 5.0 g/t quoted. Additionally, as this 
material is blended with underground ore, it is impossible to determine what the recovery 
really is. 
The 199511996 period was a particularly bad period for production throughout the mines in 
the western Bushveld (see Chapter 1), with all three of the major producers suffering problems 
of low productivity and strikes on the part of their workforce. This created a "window of 
opportunity" to open cast shallow reserves, previously ignored or thought to be uneconomic. 
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In 1996, EPL began open cast operations, once again, on the UG2 (see Chapter 5), as has 
Karee Mine (Figure 2.1). An ongoing project is underway to examine the possibility of open 
cast mining of Mer en sky reef on Western Platinum Mine (Figure 2.1). 
- . 
Amplats, hard hit by industrial unrest and obviously convinced of the success of the Bleskop 
pit, have initiated a number of open cast projects on both the UG2 and Merensky on several of 
their properties during 1996. A Merensky and a UG2 pit recently oegan production at 
B()schfontein, just south of Impala near Rustenburg. Union section has also started a UG2 pit. 
Unfortunately, little information is available about any of these pits, but Johnson Matthey 
(1996) estimate that some 5% of mined tonnage is being sourced from open cast mining at 
present, and this will probably expand over the coming year in view of the depressed metal 
prices. 
Impala is also known to be examining the possibility of open cast mining of shallow Merensky 
reserves. Unfortunately Impala have built their main milling and processing plant on top of the 
largest stretch ofUG2 open-castable shallow reserves. 
2.2 Comparison of the Economics of Open Cast Mining with Underground Mining: 
2.2.1 Background: 
In this section the costs of mining open cast ore and underground ore are compared within the 
context of the Lonrho Platinum Division (LPD) operations. The open cast costs are based on 
several quotations obtained and actual working costs for both proposed Merensky and 
working UG2 open cast operations. All quotations were obtained on a 
'cost-per-ton-of-ore-delivered' basis. This, it is believed, is the most cost effective method 
managing and operating an open cast pit. The alternative, favoured by some contractors, is for 
the client to pay for each individual task within the scope of work; topsoil stripping, soft 
overburden removal, hard overburden removal, extraction of ore and sweepings, followed by 
land reinstatement and rehabilitation. Each of these will be billable at a different rate and will 
therefore require careful measurement. This measurement can become an onerous and 
acrimonious task, causing continued conflict between the contractor and the client. It requires 
constant supervision and the skills of surveyors and accountants, which in itself represents a 
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cost (often hidden) that should be borne by the open cast operation, further increasing costs. 
These types of contracts often even cover the contractor for standing time during inclement 
weather, and generally favour the contractor over the client. 
Due to the current competitive conditions in the civil engineering/open cast mining industry it 
is possible to negotiate a mutually acceptable contract, wherein the contractor accepts some 
risk. This risk, it has been found, means that the contractor perforrrls the mining more 
conscientiously. As the contractor is paid per ton of ore, little ore tends to be left in the pit. 
The risk to the client in this is of course that waste will be delivered as ore, to increase the 
tonnage. However, this can be catered for in the contract, where maximum acceptable dilution 
factors or even the grade of the delivered ore can be specified. Non-conformance to these 
conditions will mean non-payment. 
Open cast mining in the western Bushveld, of either the UG2 or the Merensky, costs between 
R3 5 and R60/ton of ore. The Merensky is generally more costly for a given stoping width due 
to its lower specific gravity (3.2) than the UG2 (3.9). The UG2 provides more tons per unit 
area over the same stoping width and is therefore inevitably cheaper to mine than the 
Merensky to any given pit depth and ore zone thickness. The economic mining depth of an 
open cast operation is a function of a number of factors: grade, ore zone thickness, 
concentrator recovery, metal prices and mining costs are the most important of these. 
Break-even depth for the UG2 pit at EPL is approximately 40m. Cut-off depths will also vary 
as a function of time, which affects some of the factors cited above. 
The cost of underground production falls in the range ofR90 to RI10/ton ofUG2 ore at EPL. 
As with any operating mine, a large proportion of this cost is fixed, probably in the region of 
60%-70%. As labour costs account for more than 50% of the total costs, the only real 
opportunity that exists to reduce the overall costlt is that of increased productivity, a matter 
that is currently being addressed. 
Milling and flotation costs for both underground and open cast ores are very similar. 
However, if the plant is kept full, the cost of both is somewhat reduced. The reason for this is 
the very high fixed cost at the plant and economies of scale. With the plant full, the milling and 
flotation cost per ton is ±RI7.50. 
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Smelting, on the other hand, is more expensive for concentrate produced from the open cast 
ore. This is due to the lower grade of concentrate produced from the open cast ore (see 
Chapter 3). It therefore provides fewer kilograms per ton of concentrate. However, despite 
the fact that the open cast concentrate can be half the grade of underground concentrate, its 
smelting costs are only marginally higher, at ±R6.50/t of ore, than underground ore smelting 
costs which is ±R6.00/t of ore. Notice that the smelting costs are quoted per ton of ore and 
~ -
not per ton of concentrate. The reason for the small differential in smelting costs between the 
two concentrates is more to do with accounting and billing procedures applied by the LPD 
smelters. Costs are calculated on a "tons of concentrate and contained kilograms of PGM" 
basis and back calculated to tons milled. The open cast concentrate makes up only a small 
proportion of the total concentrate dispatched and its effect is therefore greatly "diluted". 
2.3 Mining Methods Employed in Open Cast Mining of the UG2: 
The mining method employed by a variety of contractors on the UG2 is remarkably uniform 
throughout all the known pits in the western Bushveld. Open cast mining differs frOIIl open pit 
mining in that the spoil, or waste rock, is returned to the pit after the removal of the ore. 
The open cast method employed in the western Bushveld, known as "convection mining" 
(because of the way material is moved from the working faces back into the backfill ~rea), is 
essentially an adaptation of coal open cast mining methods, employed in the Witbank area. It 
is also the preferred method employed by many of the chromitite mines in the western 
Bushveld. The main difference since the UG2 chromitite dips at an angle of between 8° and 
20° whereas most exploited coal deposits have a considerably lesser dip. 
2.3.1 Mining Methodology: 
"Convection mining" is especially well suited to the requirements of small operations. The 
method is efficient and incorporates land rehabilitation as an integral part of the mining cycle. 
The method was developed by Minesa Management Services (Pty) Ltd. in the early 1980's for 
the Goedenhoop Colliery, near Hendrina in the Mpumalanga Province. Interestingly, the 
method was developed from first principles, and implemented by a geologist (Patterson, 
1982). The method has a number of important advantages over other methods: 
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).> Its costs are significantly lower than other methods. 
).> It provides adjustable open pit limits. 
).> It limits highwall exposure. 
).> It limits waste handling 
).> It provides constant stripping ratios (depending on topography). 
).> It provides the opportunity for flexible grade control. 
).> It optimizes equipment utilization. 
).> It provides immediate land re-instatement. 
The convection mining method was developed for flat lying coal seams with an overlying, 
sloping topography. The geometry of this is very similar to that of a shallowly dipping, tabular 
ore body with an overlying, flat topography, such as is the case in much of the Western 
Bushveld Complex. For this reason convection mining seems to be the preferred mining 
method employed in the small open cast operations there. 
The tnlrung strips are laid out parallel to the dip of the ore body, which provides two 
immediate advantages: 
).> The profile of each successive strip is similar to that of the first, maintaining a more-or -less 
constant stripping ratio, and hence constant costs. 
).> The highwall position of each strip can be moved (to some extent), either up-dip or 
down-dip. This means that the open pit limits and hence the unit mining cost can be 
adjusted, if required, in response to price fluctuations of the material being mined or other 
criteria. 
Furthermore, as the exposure of the highwall is limited at any moment in time, pit operating 
safety is considerably improved (Patterson, 1982). 
Another advantage of this mining method is that, where there is a distinct change in grade of 
the material being mined, and if the box-cut is placed centrally, the mining sequence can be 
planned so that the two resulting faces can retreat away from the box-cut. In this way the 
material from both faces can be blended to provide a fairly constant run-of-mine (ROM) grade 
material (Patterson, 1982). This has been done successfully in coal mines, but is not known if 
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this advantage has been exploited in the western Bushveld. It is possible that doing so may 
confer some benefit when mining the Merensky Reef A major advantage of this method, 
especially in view of the ever more stringent environmental legislation and public awareness of 
environmental issues, is that it allows almost in?mediate reinstatement of land to take place 
within the operating pit. The mining cycle operates in four phases, illustrated ~, figures 2.2 to 
2.5. 
P~ase 1: The topsoil is removed and stockpiled on either the highwall or outcrop side of the 
pit (Figure 2.2). Due to the low specific gravity of soil, compared to most rock types, it is 
generally preferred not to move the topsoil too far from its original position. The topsoil may 
be removed from only a small area of the pit at one time, in which case it can be replaced once 
that section has been mined out and that area back filled, or, if the pit is small, from the whole 
pit at once. 
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Schematic Representation of Convection 1-'Iining Method: Phase 1: Topsoil Removal 
Note position of box-cut, central to the pit. 
Some soil types may become essentially sterile if they are stockpiled for long periods of time. 
This may, in some cases, be a consideration in deciding how much topsoil to strip at once. In 
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the western Bushveld, the most common soil type is black turf cotton soil. Experience has 
shown (at Crocodile River Mine, EPL, Western Platinum Mine and at Karee Mine) that this 
soil remains fertile for at least two years, and therefore requires little re-vegetation or 
treatment once put back in place. Therefore large' areas of topsoil tend to be stripped at once. 
The soil moved first is that overlying the box-cut area. The box-cut dimensions are dictated by 
,....- - ,,-' 
the size of the machinery used. Some 40t trucks require as much as SOm within which to 
manoeuvre. The positioning of the box-cut mayor may not be critical. A central box-cut 
(placed centrally along the strike length of the pit) provides more flexibility to both the mining 
contractor and to the client mining company. The drawback is that a central box-cut needs to 
be almost twice as large as one placed at either end of the pit to provide sufficient space to 
mine two faces simultaneously. 
This has cost and cash-flow implications to either the client or the contractor, depending on 
the structure of the contract. If the contractor is paid on a "per ton delivered" basis, it doubles 
the cost of the waste removal that he must carry, until the ore is removed. If the contractor is 
paid for all work performed, then the client must bear the cost of a large volume of waste 
removal, before any ore is produced. However, it does, or may, provide benefits for both 
parties, as it provides the flexibility of having two faces. Where geological losses occur, such 
as potholes or dykes, it is likely to affect only one face and thus effecting only half of the 
production. 
Phase 2: The waste rock overlying the ore body in the box-cut is removed by conventional 
blast, load-haul-dump operations and placed on the spoil dumps, either at the opposite end of 
the pit where the box-cut is placed at one end of the pit, or at either end of the pit where the 
box-cut is centrally placed. Obviously the mechanics of this vary greatly, depending on how 
fresh or weathered or fresh the rock is, and the type and size of equipment being used. If the 
rock is fresh, drilling and blasting may be necessary. Where this is done, it usually follows a 
pattern of Sm benches, a factor which is dictated to large extent by the reach of the equipment 
being used. 
Throw blasting is not employed on the UG2 pits in the western Bushveld, which is another 
departure from the coal open cast method. The reasons for this is that the top contact of the 
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UG2 tends to be quite undulose and blasting would create a loss of technical control as in 
places part of the UG2 would be removed and trucked as spoil, while in other places waste 
material would be left in place and removed with reef, causing dilution. If even 20cm of the 
UG2 was lost through throw blasting, too much UG2 tOfl.llage would be lost and the financial 
performance ofthe pit would be affected deleteriously. 
The amount of spoil thus stockpiled must be sufficient to refill the final void~ The positioning 
of these spoil dumps is supercritical, as it is the usual practice to bulldoze this spoil back into 
the final void. An error of only 20m in placing these spoil dumps can seriously effect the costs 
to the contractor. The reasons for this are that bulldozing is only cost effective over short 
distances. If the spoil dumps are wrongly placed, the material will have to be trucked back into 
the void, a much more costly exercise. 
TOP SOIL DUMP 
HARD WASTE ROCK 
--,,"~DRlLL, BIAST, LOAD, HAUL & DUMP 
FIGURE 2.3 
Schematic Representation of Convection Mining Method: Phase 2: Central Box-Cut 
Removal of hanging wall waste followed by extraction ofUG2. 
Once sufficient waste rock is removed, the extraction of ore (Reefing) can commence by 
conventional blast, load-haul-dump methods. The first step in this process is to "sweep" the 
top contact of the UG2. This can involve manual sweeping with brooms, or mechanical 
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cleaning of as much waste as is practical off the top contact of the UG2. This essentially is an 
aspect of grade control, minimizing the contamination of the ore. 
Obviously the amount of blasting required depends on the degree of weathering that the UG2 
has undergone, and to what depth. Both of these factors can be quite variable over short 
distances. To some extent it will also be determined by the size and type of the equipment 
being used in the pit. The larger the equipment the more ore can be "ripped;' by excavators, 
hydraulic shovels, etc., depending on their breakout power. In places, UG2 only 2-3m below 
surface may have to be blasted and conversely, UG2 at 20m depth may be "rippable". The 
intrinsic strength of the rock is also major factor in determining the need to blast. 
Blasting the UG2 has an effect in three major areas: firstly, the quality of the ore removed in 
terms of fine and coarse ore. The more fines that are produced the more ore will be lost 
through transport, handling, etc.. Secondly, the environmental considerations and impact of 
blasting, particularly near built-up/residential areas needs be kept to a minimum, and thirdly, 
cost. Blasting is expensive and increases the cost per ton. The scale of this is determined by 
the thickness of the ore. There is also a hidden cost to blasting, from the contractors point of 
view, in that it prevents work being carried out in close proximity to the area to be blasted for 
several hours (or even days, depending on the size of the area to be blasted) before the blast. 
Phase 3: The waste overlying the ore body in the strip immediately adjoining the box-cut is 
removed and placed back in the box-cut, once the ore has been removed from it. This material 
is then compacted if necessary, and levelled. The mining process is sequential and the face(s) 
retreat from the original box-cut. 
This phase demonstrates the main advantages of this mining method, which is that of the lack 
of double-handling of spoil. With the obvious exception of spoil from the box-cut, the spoil is 
handled only once. In large pits, this can also be applied to the removal and re-placement of 
topsoil, obviating the need to double-handle topsoil, and thus further reduce costs. 
The lowermost part of this backfill is transported within the pit, and only when the upper 
portion of the backfill is placed do the load-haul trucks need to leave the pit. This reduces the 
travel distance and the cycle time per load, which assists in keeping the mining costs low. 
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Schematic Representation of Convection Mining Method: Phase 3: Backfill Comm€(nces 
Removal of waste from areas adjoining box-cut placed in box-cut. 
Phase 4: Once the backfill is back in place and compacted, the topsoil can be replaced on top 
of the waste rock in the box-cut. The distance from the working face, at that stage, can be 
quite small. In the case of EPL, topsoil replacement is ±200m distant from the worki~& faces. 
Final rehabilitation can now begin. 
The replaced topsoil thickness is usually prescribed by the EMPR and levelling may be 
important. Too steep a slope will cause erosion, and further future expense in rectifying this. 
The mine remains responsible for the rehabilitated area in perpetuity and it is therefore 
worthwhile to ensure that the possibility of erosion is minimized. 
On small scale pits, such as these, land revegetation can take place after mining has been 
completed and the whole pit area rehabilitated. On larger pits, revegetation may be an integral 
part of the mining and rehabilitation sequence. This is often the case on large open cast 
operations, for example the Richards Bay mineral sands mine on the Natal coast. 
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Depending on the mining schedule, this means that within a month or two of the extraction of 
the ore from the box-cut, land re-instatement and rehabilitation \-\,11 be taking place. In the 
case of large pits (in terms of strike length), revegetation can commence soon after the 
extraction of ore has been completed in the bo~-c;ut. 
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FIGURE 2.5 
Schematic Representation of Convection Mining Method: Phase 4: Replacement of Topsoil 
Topsoil is replaced and re'regetation is performed. 
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2.4 Alternative Open Cast Mining Methods: 
Various alternative mining methods can be envisaged for open cast mining of the UG2 in the 
Bushveld, such as drag line excavation, or bueket excavation. These mining methods are 
known to be extremely cheap and effective in coal mining environments. Their application in 
the Bushveld environment has been examined and a number of problems with these methods 
have been identified for application in that environment. Firstly, there is tIie problem of scale. 
For example, a small drag line costs in the region of R30 million. To justifY this type of 
expenditure, an extensive pit is required. Few of the available UG2 outcrop areas are 
sufficiently large to make the use of a drag line attractive. This also applies to bucket 
excavators. Secondly, from an operational point of view, a drag line requires a level working 
surface, which would be difficult to obtain on the UG2, which dips at between go and 20° in 
the western Bushveld. Thirdly, due to the geometry of UG2 pits, the drag line would have to 
progress along strike, rather than on dip. This would require a considerable boom-reach to 
place the spoil behind the drag line, so that sufficient space would be created to enable the 
extraction of the ore. 
Another alternative being examined is the new highwall mining system, developed by Cutting 
Edge Technology Pty. Ltd., an Australian company, in collaboration with the Australian coal 
mining industry known as the Super Auger. In open cast coal mining it is often the stripping 
ratio which decides the economic cut-off depth of mining. Cutting Edge Technology have 
developed an augering system which removes coal from beneath the highwall, without the 
necessity of removing the overlying spoil. The percentage extraction is a function of the rock 
strength, with pillar size being determined by this. 
The Super Auger system can penetrate up to 200m down dip, to a maximum of 15°, from the 
highwall position in seams between 1.5 and 4.5m in thickness. The system also has active 
directional and steering capabilities in-seam. At present Cutting Edge Technology is 
attempting to adapt the technology to hard rock environments. The potential of a system such 
as this is obvious. A pit need only be mined to say 10m depth, to establish the dip and strike, 
reef thickness and consistency of the reef horizon, and then, by using the Super Auger 
technology, the reef horizon for say a further 100-150m down dip could be extracted. In 
Australia the costing structure for this is also quite attractive, as the work is subcontracted, 
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and a similar arrangement would make this system very attractive in the South African mining 
industry. This technology is finding some application in the Witbank coal field at present. 
Obviously there are still some problems to be resolved, if the Super Auger technology is to be 
successfully adapted to hard rock mining. The breakout force required for ttI~ UG2 will be 
significantly higher than for coal. The specific gravity of chromitites will require more energy 
to be expended in moving the broken ore from the bit-face/cutting-toorup:.dip into the pit. 
T1!e abrasiveness of the chromitites will require careful consideration, both in terms of cost of 
manufacture of this machinery and wear of cutting bits. 
It is envisaged that the Super Auger would be set up in the box-cut and extract the ore down 
to a pre-determined depth, and then moved, following the mining direction, to the next 
position, where the process would be repeated. Obviously this would become an integral part 
of the mining process. It could be used to exploit reserves which are too deep to mine by 
conventional open cast methods, yet too shallow to be exploited by underground methods, 
due to ground conditions. 
FIGURE 2.6 
Super Auger at maximum working inclination (15°). 
Machine operating on a 5° pit floor, tilted to mine at 15°. 
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Ent Geometry for Su er Auoer 
FIGURE 2.7 
The Super Auger cuts an excavation profile which maximizes the self supporting capacity of 
the ground, whilst achieving an acceptable level of recovery 
2.5 In-House Mining v's Contract lVlining: 
The problems of deciding whether or not to mine a deposit in-house or to contract the work 
out is a complex one, and may depend on such diverse factors as Company philosophy, 
available capital, size of deposit and therefore the projected life of the mine, and even 
geographical location. 
Most of the open cast operations in the western Bushveld Complex are being mined as 
stopgap measures, to overcome short term production problems, or to fill concentrator plants 
until underground tonnage is sufficient to do so. In this type of environment it makes little 
economic sense to expend large amounts of capital to enable in-house mining. The cost of 
plant and machinery for a 40 OOOtlmonth pit will be between R15 and R20 million and few of 
these pits could bear this kind of capital expenditure and still make a profit. 
From the point of view of the mining house or mineral rights holder, it is probably not a viable 
proposition to even consider mining a deposit itself unless the deposit is large enough to 
support mining for 5-10 years. The rate of mining is also a consideration. 
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Using contractors also facilitates some flexibility. It allows production rates to be varied 
through time, at no extra expense to the client, if the contract is properly formulated. Variable 
production rates would be very difficult to justify if the pit was being mined in house and 
substantial capital had been spent on plant and ·machinery. Once purchased, this equipment 
must be kept fully occupied to justify their purchase. Variable production would mean that the 
plant would at times be fully utilized and underutilized at others. 
Another issue is that of staffing: both the overhead that it would create, and the need for the 
pit to bear this cost, and the problem of obtaining the skilled personnel required. Once the pit 
is worked out, there would exist the problem of what to do with these personnel. 
However, for a large pit, these issues would have to be examined carefully. Amplats has 
several areas where pits of ±20km of both UG2 and Merensky could be mined by open cast 
methods. In the case of such large pit it might be more cost effective to mine these in-house. 
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Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 
3.0 Metallurgical Considerations 
The information contained in this chapter is a precis of information from various _ Mintek reports, Lonrho Platinum Division internal research and development 
reports, Mineral and Metal Extraction: An Overview, which are cited at the back of 
this work in the Bibliography and Reference section, as well as information obtained from 
various metallurgists, acknowledged in the text. 
3.1 Background: 
The concentration/recovery process employed by South African PGM producers for both the 
Merensky and the UG2 is essentially a sulfide flotation process. Froth flotation exploits the 
surface properties of minerals to achieve mineral separation. Surface properties are determined 
by the type of chemical bonding and chemical composition of a mineral, and are specific to 
that mineral species. Because of these specific properties, flotation offers the capability of 
selective separation. 
Flotation processes achieve mineral separation in an agitated slurry, through which air bubbles 
are allowed to stream. The process aims to achieve the attachment of a specific class of 
material to the air bubbles. Once attached to the air bubble, the material is raised through the 
slurry and forms a froth (due to the action of a frother added to the slurry) on the surface. The 
froth is removed at the top of the flotation cell and the material that it has selectively removed 
from the slurry forms the concentrate. 
There is a very definite limit on the size of the particles that this method can successfully 
separate. Particles need to be sufficiently small so that they can be effected by the surface 
tension of the bubbles and "attached" to the bubble, and so that it can overcome the effects of 
gravity. Flotation can be used to remove the target material or gangue, dependant upon the 
surface characteristics. 
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Flotation depends on whether a mineral is hydrophilic or hydrophobic as only hydrophobic 
minerals will selectively attach themselves to the bubbles. However, where a mineral is not 
sufficiently hydrophobic, the material (in the f9rm of the slurry) may be pre-treated or 
conditioned, to improve its hydrophobic characteristics and ensure that it will float. 
Some minerals are highly hydrophobic and will bond spontaneously to the air bubbles. If such 
minerals are plentiful in the ore, they may entirely coat the air bubbles. Wliere these minerals 
are not the target mineral and are gangue minerals, suppressants may have to be added to the 
slurry to prevent this and to facilitate the flotation of only the target mineral. Fairly common 
examples of highly hydrophobic minerals that bond spontaneously to bubbles are graphite and 
talc. 
As with any other low-grade deposit type, recovery of metal from the ore is a crucial 
consideration in both the Merensky and the UG2. The processes for both ore types are now 
very well established, but these processes are not optimal for oxidized ores, and indeed until 
recently, this was not even a consideration. Yet the scale of open cast operations does not (in 
most cases) justify either the commissioning of new concentrators, nor of extensive 
modification to existing concentrators, to optimize recoveries. It falls to the metallurgists, 
therefore, to optimize recoveries by making adjustments as best they can, within existing 
processes, to achieve this when processing open cast ore, especially when this ore is being 
batch processed. 
If, on the other hand, open cast ore is simply blended with other, underground, ROM ore, the 
overall process cannot really be adjusted in any meaningful way to optimize recoveries from 
the open cast ore. In fact, if the open cast ore is oxidized and weathered and if it is blended 
with underground ore, it may have a detrimental affect on the overall recovery. Once two ore 
types are blended, it is impossible to determine the specific effects one may have on recovery, 
and to what degree. 
There are two specific problems which need to be addressed in the western Bushveld when 
processing open cast ore. Firstly, when dealing with the Merensky, the tenor of sulfides in the 
ore is critical. Secondly, and a problem specific to the UG2 ore, is the problem of the chromite 
content of the concentrate. 
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In both cases, and as a result of treating shallow oxidized ore, the problem of introducing clay 
minerals and talc into the concentrator needs to be addressed, and managed carefully. 
In the case of the Merensky, the sulfides ·are intimately associated with the PGM 
mineralization. If the sulfides are absent (through oxidation) recoveries will be low. Bulk 
metallurgical test-work on highly oxidized Merensky ore at WPL, initially reported recoveries 
of only 15%-20% using the standard Merensky flotation process.-However, it has 
subsequently been established that recoveries could be expected to rise to between 55%-60% 
if the concentrator process were to be modified. These modifications would cost several 
million Rand and would involve, amongst other modifications, the sulfidization of the milled 
ore at the conditioning stage. However, even at 55%-60% recovery, this ore would be 
sub-economic, due to its low PGM tenor (see Chapter 5). 
Amplats, on the other hand, report recovery in the regIOn of 64% from their Bleskop 
Merensky Pit (Harrison, pers. comm., 1996). The Merensky ore from this pit is less weathered 
and oxidized than that from the WPL area, and contains some fresh sulfides. This recovery 
figure of 64% is based on bench tests, and was probably achieved using some of the 
technology and processes developed for the Platreef at PPRust. The ore from the Bleskop pit 
is railed to the main RPM processing plant and blended with ROM underground ore. It is 
therefore highly unlikely that Amplats know what the actual achieved recovery from this ore 
.. 
is. As it is processed with ROM ore in a "standard" concentrator process, and as it is 
weathered and oxidized to some extent, it is unlikely that a recovery of 64% is achieved, and 
indeed, it probably affects the recovery of the ore with which it is blended, unless it is 
substantially diluted. 
In the case of the UG2, which has a sulfide tenor an order of magnitude lower than the 
Merensky Reef, the lack of sulfide is not such a large problem as it is in the Merensky. 
However, the oxidized UG2 ore from open cast operations tends to be much more friable than 
underground ore and hence, during the milling process it tends to be over milled, giving a high 
percentage of particles <10 Jim in size. Unfortunately, this finer material is mainly made up of 
chromite, and it tends to float and reports to the concentrate, due to hydraulic entrainment. 
Chromite concentration in concentrate is one of the major problems that must be overcome in 
the processing ofUG2 ore as it creates major difficulties in the smelting process. 
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The chromite content of the concentrate from open cast ore would be expected to be higher 
than the limit set by the smelter. This limit is 3%, and based on experience, could be expected 
to be in the region of 5% for open cast concentrate. The chromite content is affected by the 
"mass pull" at the plant. The mass pull is the ratro between the mass of material milled to the 
mass of the concentrate. For example, if 100 OOOt of ore is milled and the mass of the 
concentrate is 3 OOOt, the mass pull is 3%. There is also a direct relationship between the mass 
pull and the percentage chromite content of the concentrate. The higher the mass pull, the 
higher the chromite content. The chromite content in tum affects the smelter. This is due to 
the refractory nature of chromite (Assad, pers. comm., 1996) 
As the smelting temperature of the smelters is not sufficiently high to smelt chromite if it is in 
excess of ±3 .5% due to its refractory nature, the chromite builds up in the smelter (in the form 
of a spinel-matte) and becomes very corrosive. The chromite content in the smelter has two 
main effects: firstly, it tends to settle out on the furnace hearth, and can, with time, 
considerably reduce the effective volume of the furnace and secondly, it may give rise to 
tapping problems. To overcome these problems, a smelting process was designed jointly by 
Mintek and WPL which would overcome these problems. This process involves the use of 
higher smelting temperatures and power densities (watts per square metre of furnace area), 
causing the chromium introduced as chromite, to dissolve in the matte and slag. This is then 
removed when the furnace is tapped, and negates the build up problem. 
However, this process will only work effectively when the chromite content of the charge is 
less than ±3.5%. Once the chromite content of the charge is higher, it builds up in the furnace 
and causes the problems cited above. High chromite concentrations in the furnace also cause a 
change in the basicity within the furnace, and the contents become more corrosive than it is 
designed to cope with. This requires that the smelter be "taken down" and re-bricked more 
frequently than the planned interval of once every six months, at a cost of ± R200 000. 
3.2 Other Considerations: 
One of the most serious effects of milling and processing oxidized and weathered ore is that of 
sliming. This is a particular problem where process water is recycled. Very fine material 
becomes suspended in the process water and will not settle out easily. As the water is 
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recycled, the amount of suspended fine material increases. This then begins to affect the 
recovery in the flotation process, due to the fact that this fine material coats the bubbles in the 
froth. The flotation process then becomes very efficient in floating very fine particle of gangue 
and not much else. Sliming is a function of particle size, and not so much the surface 
characteristics or chemistry. Concentrators usually cope with fine material in settling dams 
(concentrate or tailings settlers) where the residency duration and lack of agitation are 
normally sufficient to allow the fine material to settle out of the process water. Once sliming 
has occurred it is very difficult to resolve. Flocculents and coagulants on their own have 
proved ineffective. However, recent work at EPL has shown a combination of the two to be 
effective. At present the problem is being managed by the addition of large quantities of 
depressants to the slurry (Streczynski, pers. comm., 1996). 
Due to the chemical and physical nature of oxidized ore, especially in the UG2, this material 
needs to be treated and floated quite aggressively and this has two important effects: firstly, it 
means that the mass-pull is greater (and hence the concentrate grade lower) than for 
underground ore, and secondly, it increases the chromite content of the concentrate. 
At present at the EPL concentrator, the mass-pull for underground ore ranges between 0.9% 
and 1.1%, whereas the mass-pull for open cast ore varies between 1.1% and 1.8%. Obviously 
this has a marked affect on the concentrate grade: underground ore produces a concentrate 
grading ±330 glt whereas that produced from open cast ore grades between ±160 glt to 
±245 glt depending on whether shallow or deep open cast ore is being processed (Streczynski, 
pers. comm., 1996). From a smelting point of view, the lower the volume (mass-pull) and the 
higher the grade of the concentrate, the better. This has to be balanced with consideration of 
the chromite content, especially as the open cast ore tends to produce more very fine chromite 
particle in the milling stage, due to its weathered nature. 
The chromite content of the concentrate is intimately associated with the mass-pull and 
concentrate grade. There is a fine balance between the mass-pull, concentrate grade and 
chromite content. Herein lies the art of the UG2 concentrator metallurgist. To obtain an 
acceptable concentrate grade, the mass pull needs to be decreased. Decreasing the mass-pull 
will decrease the chromite content of the concentrate. Adjusting the kinematics of the froth to 
reduce chromite entrainment will also reduce the PGM recovery. Reducing the mass-pUll, to 
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increase the concentrate grade, will increase the chromite content of the concentrate. The 
metallurgist must balance these two evils to produce a concentrate of acceptable grade with an 
acceptable chromite content. 
3.3 Flotation Bench-Testing Methodology: 
One of the most difficult factors to quantify when examining a complex polymetallic ore-body 
such as the UG2 is that of metallurgical recoveries in the sulfide froth ffotation process. 
Because of these difficulties a methodology has been developed jointly by LPD and Mintek, 
and that process is outlined here and some actual data from the EPL open cast ore, which will 
be discussed later in Chapter 5. The real problem lies in relating bench-test scale results to 
what will actually occur in the concentrator when the ore in processed on a production scale. 
3.3.1 Method 
Two 1 kilogram samples of the ore are weighed out, as well as a ±250g sample (for head 
grade assay). This assayed grade is later checked against the calculated figure. Reagent 
solutions are made up and added to one of the 1 kilogram samples which is put into a rougher 
cell and temperature, pH and m V readings are taken. The rougher cell is switched on and 
agitation is started. The rotor speed is set at 1000 rpm. The required amount of reagents and 
frother are added and conditioning is allowed to take place. The rotor speed is increased to 
1200 rpm and air is introduced on the rotometre at a rate of Ill/minute. 
The concentrate is drawn off at 15 second intervals to provide five concentrate samples: 
~ First Concentrate: 0- 1 minute. 
~ Second Concentrate: 1 -3 minutes. 
~ Third Concentrate: 3 -8 minutes. 
~ Fourth Concentrate: 8 - 15 minutes. 
~ Fifth Concentrate: 15 - 20 minutes. 
The whole process above is repeated for the second 1 kilogram sample. The concentrates can 
either be combined with the (time equivalents) of the first test or kept separate. The 
concentrates are then weighed, pressure filtered and dried, and then the dry sample is weighed, 
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and the concentrate samples are submitted for assay. Nickle-sulfide assays are performed, 
which provides individual PGM grades, as well as Ni, Cu and Cr values. 
3.3.2 Interpretation of Flotation Bench-TeSt Results 
The interpretation of the data is essentially a matter of fitting the data to a Kelsall model 
curve. In the case of the UG2, the fast floating fraction is taken to represent the expected 
reeovery in the concentrator. The interpretation also involves the prediction of the chromite 
percentage concentration in the concentrate (Streczynski, pers. comm. , 1996). 
Table 3.1 
Metallurgical Test Results 
Ore Lab. Chromite 0/0 PGM+Au Assay Results 
Description Grind Recovery PGM+Au %-75 "m Feed RC % Feed RT RC 
Plant Feed 71.0% 27.1% 8.4% 90.0% 4.23 0.46 35.4 
Shallow Open Cast 74.7% 27.4% 12.5% 62.4% 4.75 1.97 31.8 
Medium Open Cast 74.7% 29.7% 12.5% 71.9% 3.96 1.26 23 .6 
Deep Open Cast 74.0% 28.0% 12.20;. 70.3% 4.44 1.44 38.5 
The plant feed was normal ROM underground ore 
RT = Rougher Tailings RC = Rougher Concentrate 
Table 3.1 is the raw data and a few of the data merit some discussion. Firstly, notice that in all 
cases for the open cast ore the grind shows a greater percentage of material finer than -75 )lm 
than for the normal (underground ore) plant feed . This is a time dependant factor, but as EPL's 
mill has a constant, fixed feed rate, this means that inevitably open cast ore is over-milled and 
produces a larger proportion of very fine material than does underground ore. This is directly 
related to the issue of the degree of weathering that the ore has undergone and it is this very 
fine material that causes sliming in the concentrator. Secondly, the chromite percentage in the 
rougher concentrate is considerably higher for the open cast ore than for the plant feed . 
Thirdly, the rougher tailing grade for the open cast ore is considerably higher than for the 
normal plant feed, even allowing for the differences in the feed grade. Finally, this data is 
based on the overall recovery of the flow rate tests, after 20 minutes. 
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The underlying presumption is that the material being tested in the laboratory will behave in a 
similar fashion on a production scale. It is known that the froth generated on a bench scale is 
"thinner" and has slightly different kinematics than that in the plant. These data are therefore 
taken to be the lower limit (minimum percentage recovery) of what can be expected in 
production in the plant. 
Ore 
Description 
Plant Feed 
Shallow Open Cast 
Medium Open Cast 
Deep Open Cast 
Table 3.2 
Expected Minimum Recoveries: PGM + Au 
(Fast Floating Fraction) 
PGM + Au Fast Floating Expected Minimum Plant 
Fraction (%) PGM + Au Recovery (%) 
79.0% 80.0% 
- -
53 .8% 53.8% 
57.0% 57.0% 
The percentage recoveries are fitted to a Kelsall curve and from that a prediction is made as to 
the recoveries that can be expected from the ore in question, once processed through the 
plant. This data is presented in Table 3.2, above. In fitting the data to the Kelsall curves, only 
the data relating to the fast floating fraction is used. Unfortunately, there was insufficient 
sample concentrate for the fast floating fraction of the shallow open cast ore on which to 
perform a nickel-sulfide assay test, and there was therefore no data available for this ore. 
The accuracy of the predicted recoveries, based on these bench tests, will be discussed further 
in chapter five. Chapter four will examine some of the environmental considerations that need 
to be addresses before mining can proceed. 
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Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 
4.0 Environmental Considerations of Open cast Mining 
4.1 Background: 
T he Minerals Act, No 50, 1991 was enacted: "to regulate the prospecting for and the optimal exploitation, processmg 
and utilization of minerals; to provide for the safety and health of persons 
concerned in mines and works; to regulate the orderly utilization and the 
rehabilitation of the surface of land during and after prospecting and 
mining operations; and to provide for matters connected therewith." 
(The italics are the writer's.) 
In terms of this act, an Environmental Management Programme Report (EMPR) is required 
for any proposed prospecting and mining. The main aim of an EMPR is to determine the 
environmental management criteria to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive 
impacts in the exploration and mining milieu. The important philosophy behind the Act and the 
requirements of the EMPR is that a mine site should affect as little land as possible, and those 
effects should be managed to limit the long term damage. This means that the land usage after 
mining must be planned and managed throughout the life of the mine. One of the objectives of 
the Act is to provide a closure certificate for the mine, once all the requirements of the EMPR 
have been adequately addressed. Even after the issuance of a closure certificate, the mining 
company or the holder of the mineral rights remains responsible in perpetuity for, inter alia, 
the management and treatment of mine drainage water and tailings dumps. 
4.1.1 Specific Requirements for Open Cast Operations 
Neither the Act nor the EMPR Aide Memoir relates any specific requirements for open cast 
operations. This is due to the fact that the Minerals Act redefined the term mine to include: 
65 
dissert - 1/10/97 
(i) "any excavation in the earth, including the portion of the sea or under 
the water or in any tailings, as well as any borehole, whether being 
worked or not, made for the purpose of searching for or winning a 
mineral" 
(ii) "any other place where a mineral deposit is being exploited, including 
the mining area and all buildings, structures, machinery, mine dumps, 
access roads or objects situated on such area and which are used or 
intended to be used in connection with such searching, wmrung or 
exploration or for the processing of such mineral: ... " 
Under the previous Act, quarries and sand and gravel pits were not included in the definition. 
The EMPR requirements for all "mines" are now the same, subject to certain exemptions. 
4.2 Environmental Management Programme Report: 
The Minerals Act, 1991, requires every mine owner to submit, and obtain approval of, an 
EMPR before mining or exploration operations begin. The purpose of the EMPR is to 
compile an environmental management programme that is acceptable to all concerned, "with a 
view to leaving a useful heritage to future generations after the mineral resources have been 
extracted" (Aide Memoir). The EMPR is a wide ranging document and on submittal, is 
scruitinized be several Government Departments, including: 
~ The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
~ The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
~ The Department of Environmental Affairs 
~ The Department of Agriculture 
~ The Department of National Health and Population Development 
~ The Department of Finance 
The first three listed here take an active role in assisting to draft the EMPR, and ensure that 
various criteria are met. The latter three are only interested in the information contained in the 
approved EMPR document and do not involve themselves in the drafting process. 
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4.2.1 Purpose of the EMPR 
The purpose of the EMPR is to provide a single document that satisfies the authorities 
concerned with regulation of the environnterttal impacts of mining by describing the 
pre-mining environment at the proposed mine site and assessing the significant impacts that 
the mine is likely to have on the environment both during and after mining. 
The EMPR must also describe how the negative impacts of mining will be managed, and the 
positive impacts will be maximized. The positive impacts are mainly seen to be 
socio-economic, and therefore the project must be motivated and the benefits described, either 
on a local or national scale. The most important purpose of the EMPR is that of setting out 
the actual management programme, which will be applied throughout the life of the project so 
that stated and agreed land capability and closure objectives can be achieved, and a closure 
certificate issued, and of course, to ensure that sufficient funds are set aside to implement the 
environmental management programme. 
4.2.2 Requirements of the EMPR 
The EMPR takes the form of a report divided into 11 parts: 
Part 1: 
Part 2: 
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Part 1 is a brief project description including data on the proponent and on the 
proposed project: 
~ Administrative detail. 
Part 2 is essentially a description of pre-mining environment, optimally, as it 
was before mining commenced. It requires rather comprehensive and detailed 
accounts of following topics: 
~ Geology - representative sections, borehole logs, geological map, and an 
assessment of how the material to be mined will affect the water quality. 
~ Climate - a description of the climate in the area. 
~ Topography - Topographical plans. 
~ Soils - Description and plan of soil types. 
67 
Part 3: 
Part 4: 
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Y Pre-Mining Land capability - Land-use classification maps and existing 
structures. 
Y Natural Vegetation - Vegetation maps. 
Y Surface Water - Complete' hydrological assessment of the area to be 
mined, including the catchment and water quality. 
Y Ground Water - Complete hydrological assessment and effects of mining 
thereto. 
Y Air Quality - Complete survey of existing air quality and an assessment of 
the impact mining will have on it. 
Y Noise - Identification of existing and an estimate of impact of mining on 
noise levels. 
Y Archaeological & Cultural Sites - Such sites need be noted. 
Y Sensitive Landscapes - Description of areas of statutory protection is 
required. 
Y Visual Aspects - Assessment of visual impact of mine site. 
Y Regional Socio-Economic Structure - Assessment of the impact of the 
mine on socio-economic structure, on a regional or national basis. 
Y Interested and Affected Parties - Parties with whom consultation may be 
required. 
Part 3 requires a fairly detailed motivation of the proposed project requiring 
financial data as well as an assessment of the socio-economic impact of it: 
Y Benefits of the Project - Estimates of expenditure, labour force, multiplier 
effect and market. 
Y Alternative Projects - A record of all alternative options considered for the 
mine site. 
Part 4 requires a detailed description of the proposed project. This will 
obviously be used to assess what the impact will be on the pre-mining 
environment, described in part 2: 
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Part 5: 
Part 6: 
Part 7: 
? Surface Infrastructure - All proposed infrastructure, waste management 
facilities, water pollution and treatment management facilities, mineral 
processing plant, housing, transport, water balance diagram, disturbances 
of water courses and storm ~ater management. 
? Construction Phase - Brief description. 
? Operational phase - Detailed description of impact on the environment of 
- -
infrastructure, mineral processing, plant residue disposal, transport, river 
diversions. 
Part 5 is the environmental impact assessment. In this section the proponent is 
required to demonstrate an in-depth understanding of the impact that the 
proposed project will have, and how those impacts will be managed: 
? All the foregoing factors must be covered in such a way that the mining 
proponent can demonstrate that he has considered and understood the 
potential or expected impacts of the project on the environment,·· for all 
stages of the project: construction, operational, decommissioning and 
post-closure in terms of all the topics described in part 2. 
Part 6 details the actual Environmental Management Programme: 
Note: This is the only part of the EMPR which becomes legally binding, 
once the EMPR is approved. 
? Management programme for all the environmental impacts described in 
Part 5 of this document for all stages of the proposed project, including a 
proposed timetable, duration and sequence of events, for both mining and 
exploration and financial provisions that will be made. 
Part 7 forms the conclusions: 
? Detail of the overall net impact of the proposed project on the environment. 
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The last four parts (Parts 8-11) deal with documentation, permits for the project, statutory 
requirements, references and supporting documentation. Part 11 provides for financial and 
propriety material which is included in the EMPR but which the proponent may wish to 
remain confidential. , . 
Part 8: 
Part 9: 
Part 10: 
Part 11: 
Statutory Requirements: 
~ A list of all permission granted, pertaining to the proposed project. 
Amendments to EMPR: 
References and Supporting Documentation: 
Confidential Material: 
4.3 Environmental Implication of Open Cast Mining at EPL: 
Lonrho was the first platinum mining house to have obtained approval of its EMPR in South 
Africa, for Western Platinum Mine. Eastern Platinum Ltd. was in the process of finalizing 
their EMPR when the open cast project began, and at that stage it was decided to incorporate 
all possible open cast areas into it. However, as the EMPR is designed to be a dynamic 
document, subject to change in some respects, according to changing circumstances, had the 
EMPR already been approved revisions to it could have been submitted to the Regional 
Director of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs for approval. This was the case on 
WPL when they decided to proceed with open cast operations there. 
The main considerations, as far as the EMPR is concerned, are those of ground water, rivers 
and land rehabilitation and use after mining. The issue of land use after mining can, to some 
extent, be determined by the land owner. If the land was veld before mining, but is suitable for 
agricultural purposes, the land owner can opt to have the rehabilitated mine area converted to 
agricultural use after mining. Obviously this will depend to a large extent on land use in the 
surrounding area, and is subject to approval by the Departments of Environment Affairs, 
Agriculture and Water Affairs. 
An environmental risk analysis of the proposed open cast areas was performed and a number 
of problematic factors were identified. The 2# East Pit area is traversed by a non-perennial 
stream, and dwellings lay within a 500m radius of the pit. The 3# West Pit also has dwellings 
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within 500m radius of it and lies adjacent to a provincial road. The 3# East Pit is also 
traversed by a non-perennial stream. 
Of these problems the most difficult to overc6me is the existence of streams traversing the 
open cast areas. Blasting can be tailored to minimize the effect on nearby dwellings and roads. 
All the nearby dwellings lie to the south of the proposed pits and this could be used to the 
mine's advantage. As the dip-slopes of the pits dip towards the north, when blasting occurred 
the shockwave would be directed upwards (into the air) in a southerly direction. The presence 
of a thick cover of Black Turf Cotton Soil would also cushion the effects of blasting as it is 
not conducive to propagating a surface shock wave. 
Various options were examined to deal with the problems of the existence of streams 
traversing the pits, under the guidance of a consulting hydrogeologist. The Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry (DW AF) were consulted and, initially at least, they required a fully 
fledged river diversion around the pit. An estimate of costs for the scope of work required 
ran to several million Rand. This would have severely affected the profitability of the pits 
concerned. Negotiations were held with the DW AF, wherein hydrological data (flow histories, 
volumes, total dissolved solids (IDS) data, etc.) was presented to them, as well as alternative 
solutions to deal with the streams. Eventually permission was granted to mine without a 
stream diversion, subject to certain conditions being met, to wit: the stream area must be 
mined and re-instated within one dry season; the landfill below the re-instated stream must be 
compacted to specific specifications; the re-instated stream bed must be clay lined and 
rock-clad; and finally the re-instated stream bed must be grassed to reduce erosion and TDS. 
The DW AF also imposed several other requirements. No spoil or topsoil could be dumped or 
stockpiled within a fixed distance of the stream bed and berm walls had to be constructed (to 
certain specifications) on either side of the stream once it was reinstated. The stream flow and 
water quality must be measured and monitored whenever it flows. The main consideration 
here is that silt must be prevented from entering the catchment so that down-stream users 
should not be adversely affected by the mining of the pit. 
The DW AF have reserved the right to immediately halt all operations in the pit if any of their 
stipulations are not being adhered to, and to impose severe fines on EPL in such an event. 
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Any water made in the pit during the operational phase must be pumped into settling dams 
and allowed to settle before it is released into the river catchment system, also a measure to 
keep silt out of the river system. 
Water monitoring boreholes were required to be in place before mining commenced, both 
up-stream and down-stream of the pit limits. Once mining is complete, further water 
monitoring borehole are required on, or next to, any geological feature (fault: dyke, etc.) that 
extends beyond the limits of the pit. 
The blasting license was granted without any problem, or onerous requirements, based on the 
blast design submitted to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. However, there is 
provision made from the profits of the open cast operation, to cover any potential claims 
against the company for damage to dwellings and other structures. 
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Chapter 5 
5.0 Case Study: UG2 Open CastProject at Eastern Platinum Ltd. 
5.1 Background: 
E astern Platinum Ltd. (Figure 5.1), the subject of this case study, began shaft sinking in 1987 following several years of exploration. It was originally planned to mine 160 OOOt per month, but due to improvements in the plant and revision of mine 
planning, now mines ±200 OOOt per month. In February 1990 the first UG2 open cast 
operation (A-West Pit, Figure 5.1) was started and in September 1990 a second pit (C-West 
Pit, Figure 5.1) was begun, in an attempt to fill the plant, which was running under capacity 
due to a slower build up of tonnage from underground than planned. At that time, Eastern 
Platinum Ltd. fell within the former Bophuthatswana Homeland and obtaining mining 
permission was relatively easy. These pits were planned to mine to 40m depth at a rate of 
35 0001 and 57 OOOt per month. At the time these pits were started, and for much of their life, 
PGM prices were high. It was during this period that rhodium peaked at just over $7 OOO/oz, 
and platinum was above $500/oz (Chapter 1). The shallow ore (0-8m) was sold to Crocodile 
River Mine whose plant reported good recoveries from the ore; better than EPL believed 
could be obtained from its own plant at the time. 
However, due to contractual problems, little profit was made from these two pits, despite the 
high PGM prices prevailing at the time. In fact, an analysis of the data from those pits shows 
that the mining costs were Rl12/t of ore mined for a total of 1.658 Mt extracted from the two 
pits. Total profit, for the two pits was R5.2 million, giving a return based on cash flows in real 
terms, of 3.9%. Various factors were identified which contributed to the poor return, but 
essentially it is felt that too little work, if any, was put into the feasibility study. For example 
the first pit was not drilled at all, and the tonnage and grades were based on "guesstimates" 
derived from the mineral resource documents. This document itself was unreliable due to the 
newness of the mine and the paucity of data available at that point in time. This translated into 
an overestimate of the Reef thickness as well as an underestimate of the dip, creating a 
discrepancy between planned and actual tons of 100 000 t. 
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During the latter part of 1995 underground production began to decline quite dramatically, 
due to massive ground losses, which affected all three declines simultaneously. These losses 
were due to a series of, for EPL, large potholes as well as several levels encountering large 
faults (30m). Although many of these potholes had been identified beforehand using ground 
magnetics, the planning had not taken account of the effect that they would have on 
production. These potholes were subsequently found to be large (>200m in diameter) and to 
overlap each other. The time needed to re-establish the levels, which had encountered those 
fa~lts, on the other side of the faults is, on average, 14 months. At the same time there was a 
major drive on within the Lonrho group to increase the underground proved ore reserves 
(proved through development) from 12 to 18 months. It became obvious that unless 
something drastic was done the company would not only not be able to meet its production 
quotas, and thereby fulfil metals contracts, but would also not be able to increase its proved 
ore reserves. Compounding these problems was that of inexplicably low productivity in the 
underground operations (see Chapter 1). 
Several areas of shallow UG2 are present on the property which had not previously been 
exploited (Figure 5.3), either by open cast mining or from underground and a project was 
initiated by the Chief Geologist to examine the possibility of mining them profitably. This 
would provide tonnage to overcome the problems encountered underground, and increase the 
proved ore reserve while maintaining production levels. 
Due to known resistance at senior management levels, because of their previous experiences 
with open cast mining on the properties and its perceived lack of profitability, a very cautious 
approach was adopted. It was clear that a simple approach, quoting grades and tonnages 
would not persuade management to proceed with the project. Whatever approach used would 
have to show a worthwhile bottom-line profit. It was known that a return of about 30% would 
be acceptable. Anything substantially less would not be approved. 
The above factors required that a fairly sophisticated model would have to be developed, 
incorporating procedures used for assessing underground potential and mirroring them as 
closely as possible. The data and factors used must be as accurate as possible and the costs 
and profit must be well defined. 
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5.2 Pre-Feasibility Study: 
Initially, three areas with potential for open cast mining the UG2 were identified: an area 
immediately to the east of No. 2 Incline (called <t~e 2# East Pit); and two areas immediately to 
the east (3# East Pit) and west (3# West Pit) of No. 3 Incline (Figure 5.3). The area to the 
west of No. 2 Incline was deemed to be too small, being bordered to the west by the Sun City 
Road. The depths to which these pits could be mined would be determit.!ed by the depth of 
underground workings (Figure 5.3). The pit boundaries were essentially pre-determined by 
faults or dykes (east and west of the 2# East Pit as well as to the east of the 3# West Pit), 
underground workings on dip in the case of all three pits, or previously open cast areas (as is 
the case at the 3# East Pit) (Figure 5.3). In aU three cases the outcrop had been trenched and 
sampled during 1990 and that sampling data was available (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 
Trench sampling results from the 2# East Pit 
UG2 thickness Grade~/t Comment 
Trench 01 60 cm Not sampled Potholed 
Trench 02 175 em 6.1 g/t Split Reef 
Trench 03 130 em 10.2 g/t Normal 
Trench 04 150 em 9.2 g/t Normal 
Trench 05 50 cm Not sampled Potholed 
Trench 06 150 em 9.4 g/t Normal 
Trench 07 120 em 4.23 g/t Normal 
Trench 08 45 cm Not sampled Potholed 
Trench 09 150 em 5.43 g/t Normal 
Trench 10 130 em 4.65 g/t Faulted 
Several other parameters needed to be estimated for each of the pits, such as grade, tonnage, 
geological losses, etc. , and these are discussed below: 
5.2.1 Borehole Data: 
None of the prospective areas had any boreholes, and at that stage no budget was available to 
drill any boreholes. The ore resources on the Lonrho properties are estimated using an inverse 
distance method, which is blocked out in 500m x 500m blocks. It was deemed that this would 
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be sufficient for an initial "first pass" financial model. The grade for each pit was estimated 
from the annual ore resource document and the tonnage, of both ore and waste was estimated 
using a spreadsheet template (Mallinson, 1995). 
5.2.2 Geological Losses: 
Geological losses underground, due to potholes, faults and dykes, are excluded from the ore 
resources. For proved mineral resources, the amount deducted is based on empirical data and 
it is applied to a specific level, based on current logging and that level's history. For probable 
mineral resources, a factor of 15% is applied, based on some 25 years of mining history. As all 
three of the proposed pits had underground workings immediately down dip of them, 
empirical data for areas close at hand was available. The geological losses for these areas 
varied between 7% and 12%. However, despite this a conservative figure of 20% was used. 
5.2.3 Metallurgy: 
Discussions with metallurgists in the company indicated that "shallow" and "deep'~ore would 
have to be treated separately, as the shallow ore would, based on experience, be more 
oxidized, and that different recoveries could be expected from each. In view of this, the 
financial model would have to reflect this. Fortunately, the Metallurgical Manager at EPL had 
worked at Crocodile River Mine and hence had experience of milling and flotation ,?f UG2 
open cast ore. He estimated that, due to the general metallurgical improvements in place at the 
EPL plant, a recovery of 68% could be expected from the shallow ore and a recovery of 74% 
from the deep ore, based on a cut-off of 15m vertical depth. In the past when EPL had milled 
open cast ore, a recovery of 63.8% was obtained from deep open-cast ore and 70.1 % 
recovery from underground ore. However, recoveries of 68% for shallow ore and 74% for 
deep ore were felt to be too high. At the time recovery for underground ore was 
approximately 82%. It was therefore decided to err on the side of conservatism, and the 
recoveries used were reduced to 64% and 68 % respectively for shallow and deep ore. 
As the concentration plant was running under capacity, the milling and concentrator costs 
were running higher than they would if the plant was full. This is due to a rather large fixed 
overhead. Despite the fact that the open cast ore would fill the mill it was decided to use the 
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then current milling and concentrating costlt, which amounted to R17.44/t. The smelting cost 
was fixed at R5. OOlt of ore, the current smelting cost/ton, as these economies of scale would 
not be evident at the smelter, due to the small additional amount of concentrate that it would 
produce. 
It was decided to apply the normal smelter recovery factor of 99%. It was felt that the amount 
of open cast concentrate would be such a small proportion of the total smelted, and sufficient 
dilution would occur, to make the additional chromite quite insignificant. Also, as the mass 
pun had recently been reduced (and hence the concentrate grade increased), and although this 
had increased the percentage of chromite in the concentrate, the absolute mass of chromite 
had been reduced. 
5.2.4 Transport: 
Ore from all three inclines on EPL is trucked from the shafts, over a weighbridge, to the plant. 
The distances vary from just over 2 km to 9.5 km. The transport is contracted out to a 
transport specialist and their cost/tlkm was employed for the transport cost of OI:efiom the 
open pits to the plant. That cost amounts to 42c/t/km. However, this cost operates on a fuel 
"rise and fall" basis and account would have to be taken of this. 
5.2.5 Contract Mining: 
Due to the limited tonnage available from prospective open pits, it was obvious right from the 
beginning that to mine them would be a short term solution to the problem of filling the plant. 
This is reinforced by the fact that due to lower recoveries it was expected to be less profitable 
than filling the plant with unoxidized, higher grade underground ore. Capital expenditure on 
mining plant and equipment to mine these resources was therefore out of the question. 
Furthermore, it was recognized that this form of mining is very different to EPL's normal 
core-business: underground mining. If it was a viable proposition, the mining of the open pits 
would be contracted out. This had the advantage of requiring virtually no capital expenditure. 
For the purposes of modelling the proposed mining, mining costs of between R40 and R50lt 
of ore were used. These costs were based on the then current mining costs known to be 
80 
disserl - 1/10/97 
incurred by the Amplats group at their Bleskop Merensky open cast operation (R44/t), near 
Kroondal in the North West Province. 
5.2.6 Delineation Costs: 
Some small amount of capital expenditure would, however, be required. The pit areas would 
have to be drilled to prove ore resources and resolve as much of the structure as possible 
before mining commenced. These costs were estimated and the data fed into the template. 
5.3 Financial Template - A First Pass Analysis: 
A financial template was developed, incorporating all of the above data and factors (Figure 
5.4). In addition to this a number of other factors had to be incorporated, to make the model 
as robust as possible. To remove the effects of inflation and a volatile exchange rate, the 
prevailing metal prices and $:R exchange rates for February 1996 were used. This was 
necessary as the operating profit is calculated twice monthly, based on actual metal prices and 
exchange rates. 
A further complication in this regard is the fact that future revenue predicted from mine 
planning and production is based on an 18 month forecast by market consultants. The 
February 1996 metal prices were not particularly good (Figure 1.3) and the $:R excha!lge rate 
had begun its long downhill slide. The metal prices at prevailing exchange rates are used to 
calculate a Matte-Valuation, which is the Net Realization per kg of metal in Matte (Converter 
Matte). It reflects the actual proportional recoveries of each of the metals for Pt, Pd, Rh, Ir, 
Os and Au as well as Cu and Ni for a specific ore. As Rh was in oversupply in the marketplace 
at the time (Chapter 1) and Lonrho was stockpiling it rather than selling it, it was also decided 
to set the Rh value at zero in the matte valuation metals' basket. This provided a very 
conservative matte valuation ofR29 754/kg based on an exchange rate of$3.6525:R1. 
5.3.1 Preliminary Results: 
All this data was then fed into the financial template (Figure 5.4). Various scenarios were then 
examined, wherein the various factors and costs were varied within certain parameters. This 
81 
dissert - 1/10/97 
involved examining the effect of changing the tonnages, (by adjusting the highwall position up 
to the maximum as dictated by the depth of underground workings), varying the 
Matte-Valuation (as well as exchange rates), examining the effects of different recoveries, 
geological losses, dilution factors and fuel prices. . 
In all, twenty scenarios were examined for each pit using an iterative approach. All of these 
scenarios were profitable, and the profit varied between R6.0 million and almost R20.0 
million. Interestingly, in every one of the different scenarios, the 2# East pit was the most 
profitable. This was surprising because No.2 Incline has historically had the lowest grade of 
the three inclines. However, this proposed pit is closest to the plant, and hence attracts the 
lowest transport costs. Additionally, despite having the same strike length as the 3# East Pit, 
this pit holds the greatest tonnage because it could me mined to 30m depth along its entire 
strike length (the ground conditions were so poor in the underground workings that no mining 
could take place above 35m below surface) whereas the 3# East pit can only be mined to 25m 
below surface. Furthermore, the VG2 channel (reet) thickness, from the mineral resource 
document (130cm) was much thicker that the channel thickness at either of the other two pits. 
A selection of the most reasonable scenarios (their "reasonableness" decided by the General 
Manager and the Chief Geologist. Figure 5.4 was considered to be the most reasonable for the 
2# East Pit.) as well as a proposed drilling programme were presented to senior management 
on the 4th of March 1996. Approval was sought and obtained to proceed with a_ drilling 
programme required to prove the mineral resources and obtain sufficient sample to perform 
metallurgical testing. In fact, senior management indicated that the proposed drilling 
programme be considerably expanded to avoid problems encountered in the previous pits due 
to a lack of drilling in them before they were begun. Permission was also obtained to approach 
mining contractors to obtain provisional quotations on mining costs. It was decided to 
concentrate on the 2# East Pit, in preference to the 3# East and West Pits. Nonetheless, these 
pits must too be further investigated. 
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FIGURE 5.4 
PROPOSED OPEN-CAST AREA EAST OF 2 INCLINE: FIRST PASS ANALYSIS 
PRESUMPTIONS: 
RESERVES (fONS) 0-15m 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 20% 
MINEABLE TONS (ORE) 
MINING DILUTION 15% 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED kg 
RESERVES (fONS) 15-30 m 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 20% 
MI:".'EABLE TONS (ORE) 
MINING DILUTION 15% 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED kg 
REEF TONS TOTAL 
MILLED TONS 
TONS MINED 
PGE kg in conc. 
PGEGRADE g/t 
PGE kg in matte kg 
M.ATTE VALUATION R/kg 
ON-MIl'<'E COSTS 
MI]'I,'1NG/t Rand 
MILLING/t 
SMELTING COST/t Rand 
TRANSPORT @42c/tlkm Rand 
TOTAL COSTS/t OF ORE Rand 
REVENL'E/t Rand 
DELINEATION COSTS Rand 
GROSS REVENUE Rand 
GROSS COSTS Rand 
GROSS PROFIT/t Rand 
GROSS PROFIT (fOTAL) Rand 
COSTIkg Rand 
PROFITIkg Rand 
MARGIN % Rand 
(Gross Pronu Gross Revenue)'" 100 
Matte Valuation R29 7541kg 
Dilution grade 0.3 g/t 
Mining costs R40-R50/t of ore 
Mining Depth: 30mbs 
Rand/$: R3.6525:$1 
R40/t < R42 50/t 
321,911 321,911 
64,382 64,382 
257,529 257,529 
38,629 38,629 
64% 64% 
897 897 
321,911 321,911 
64,382 64,382 
257,529 257,529 
38,629 38,629 
68% 68% 
954 954 
643,822 643,822 
592,316 592,316 
643,822 643,822 
1851 1851 
5.40 5.40 
1795 1795 
29,754 29,754 
40.00 42.50 
17.44 17.44 
5.00 5.00 
4.92 4.92 
67.43 69.93 
90.19 90.19 
41,250 41,250 
53,421,332 53,421,332 
39,939,672 41,420,463 
22.76 20.26 
13,481,660 12,000,869 
22,245 23,070 
7,509 6,684 
25% 22% 
Tons & Grades from 1995 Mineral Resources Document 
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R45/t R4750/t .- R50/t 
-
321,911 321,911 321,911 
64,382 64,382 64,382 
257,529 257,529 257,529 
~ . 
38,629 38,629 38,629 
64% 64% 64% 
897 897 897 
321,911 321,911 321,911 
64,382 64,382 64,382 
257,529 257,529 257,529 
38,629 38,629 38,629 
68% 68% 68% 
954 954 954 
643,822 643,822 643,822 
592,316 592,316 592,316 
643,822 643,822 643,822 
1851 1851 1851 
5.40 5.40 5.40 
1795 1795 1795 
29,754 29,754 29,754 
45.00 47.50 50.00 
17.44 17.44 17.44 
5.00 5.00 5.00 
4.92 4.92 4.92 
72.43 74.93 77.43 
90.19 90.19 90.19 
41,250 41,250 41,250 
53,421,332 53,421,332 53,421,332 
42,901,253 44,382,044 45,862,834 
17.76 15.26 12:76 
10,520,079 9,039,288 7,558,498 
23,895 24,719 25,544 
5,859 5,035 4,210 
20% 17% 14% 
5.4 Feasibility Study: 
5.4.1 Drilling Programme: 
A drilling programme was designed for all three pits. As mentioned previously, trenching had 
been performed in 1990 on the entire outcrop strike length of all three pits. Three phases of 
drilling were planned (Figure 5.5). The first phase, with holes ±200m agart on strike along 
lines ±35 m apart on dip were to be diamond drill holes, obtaining UG2 reef intersections of 
NQ size (47.5mm diameter). The second phase would be in-fill drilling, with the holes placed 
midway between the phase 1 holes. The decision as to whether these holes would be diamond 
drill holes or reverse circulation percussion holes (102mm diameter) would be based on the 
core recovery and general condition of the core from the phase 1 drilling. The third phase 
would consist of further in-fill drilling, between the phase 2 holes. Once again the holes would 
be either diamond drill holes or reverse circulation percussion holes dependent upon the core 
recovery and condition of the core obtained from phases 1 and 2. 
Phase 1 diamond drilling began on the 6th of March and was completed at the 2# East Pit on 
the 17th of March. A total of 365m in 15 holes was drilled. The core recovery was remarkably 
good (>95%), although it was badly broken and deeply weathered in some holes. It was 
decided at that point to continue with the phase 2 drilling, using reverse circulation drilling 
methods. This second phase began on the 29th of March and was completed at the 2# East Pit 
on the 1st of April 1996. A total of 348m in 16 boreholes was drilled. 
The core from the Phase 1 diamond drilling was logged and the UG2 layer sampled. Whole 
core sampling was performed as only this would provide sufficient mass for both assaying and 
metallurgical testing. The UG2 was crushed, pulverized and split. One half of the split of each 
borehole core was sent to Mintek for assay of individual PGM's, Au, Ni & Cu. Th~ other half 
of the samples were composited and sent for metallurgical testing in-house. These composited 
samples were depth specific. All the samples from the shallow holes were composited; all the 
samples from the deep holes were composited and all the samples from the medium depth 
holes were composited, to provide three samples for the metallurgical test work. 
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5.4.2 Drilling Results: 
Of the 15 phase 1 diamond drill holes, six intersections of the UG2 contained Split Reef. This 
is a widespread phenomenon on EPL and is often, though not necessarily, associated with 
potholing of the reef horizon. In split reef areas: the UG2 contains lenses of either anorthosite 
(usually mottled in texture), feldspathic pyroxenite or rarely, pegmatoid (pegmatoidal 
feldspathic pyroxenite). They can cover areas of up to 200m x 200m and frequently will 
pothole towards their centre (Figure 5.6). The lens contained within the reef, be it anorthosite, 
pyroxenite or pegmatoid, never carries any value and therefore stoping such split reef requires 
careful control. The reverse circulation boreholes indicated two definite potholes and five split 
reef areas, one of which was definitely potholed. This data, as well as data from underground 
and other sources (ground-magnetics, trenching, etc.) was used to construct a structural map 
of the 2# East Pit (Figure 5.7). By convention, the split reef areas delimit only those areas 
where the internal waste is >50cm. A pothole was thought (from information about previous 
mining at the east end of the pit area) to exist on the eastern end of the pit, which was 
supported by ground magnetics interpretation. This has subsequently been confirmed by 
mining at the pit (Figure 5.7). 
The assay results for the boreholes are given in Table 5.2. The drilling revealed a slightly 
steeper dip, of 15°, rather than the originally estimated 13°. The average reef thickness of 
147.5cm (channel width) was also considerably more that the mineral resources esti!llate of 
130cm. This dictated that the tonnage per unit area would be greater than anticipated. The 
average grade of the boreholes was almost identical to the predicted grade from the mineral 
resource estimate. This in itself was quite impressive as the pit area had no previous borehole 
information. The average grade of the boreholes was 5.37 glt (corrected) as opposed to 5.4 
glt (corrected) as estimated. The Pt:Pd ratios are rather skewed. This is due to the mobility of 
Pd in the secondary environment. Some of the Pt:Pd ratios are as high as 10:1 (Table 5.2). 
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Borehole Assay Lab. 
C1 Mintek 
C2 Mintek 
C3 Mintek 
C4T Mintek 
C4B Mintek 
CST Mintek 
C5B Mintek 
C6T Mintek 
C6B Mintek 
C7 Mintek 
C8 Mintek 
C9 Mintek 
C10 Mintek 
C11 Mintek 
C12 Mintek 
C13 Mintek 
C14 Mintek 
C16 Mintek 
~ve . 
Pt Pd Rh Au 
2.20 1.05 0.40 0.04 
2.75 0.90 0.54 0.01 
2.35 1.04 0.42 0.01 
2.60 0.45 0.39 0.00 
2.50 1.15 0.47 0.01 
2.90 1.35 0.66 0.01 
1.80 0.18 0.27 0.01 
3.30 2.10 0.56 0.06 
2.70 1.10 0.40 0.02 
2.60 1.50 0.48 0.03 
2.75 1.45 0.51 0.01 
2.40 0.76 0.41 0.01 
2.40 1.15 0.42 0.02 
2.75 0.86 0.48 0.01 
2.45 1.05 0.42 0.02 
2.95 1.00 0.54 0.01 
2.80 1.65 0.52 0.02 
3.30 2.55 0.56 0.05 
2.64 1.18 0.47 0.02 
TABLE 5.2: 
UG2Cr : PGM Splits 
aft % Corr Ratios 
Ru Ir 3PGM+Au 5PGM+Au Pt Pd Rh Au Ru Ir Fact Pt: Pd Pt: Rh 
0.77 0.18 3.69 4.64 47.4 22.6 8.6 0.9 16.6 3.9 1.26 2.10 5.50 
0.90 0.21 4.20 5.31 51 .8 16.9 10.2 0.2 16.9 4.0 1.26 3.06 5.09 
0.71 0.17 3.82 4.70 50.0 22.1 8.9 0.2 15.1 3.6 1.23 2.26 5.60 
0.76 0.18 3.44 4.38 59.4 10.3 8.9 0.0 17.4 4.1 1.27 5.7Q 6.67 
0.80 0.19 4.13 5.12 48 .8 22.5 9.2 0.2 15.6 3.7 1.24 2.17 5.32 
0.89 0.24 4.92 6.05 47.9 22.3 10.9 0.2 14.7 4.0 1.23 2.115 4.39 
0.74 0.17 2.26 3.17 56.8 5.7 8.5 0.3 23.3 5.4 1.40 10.00 6.67 
1.00 0.23 6.02 7.25 45.5 29.0 7.7 0.8 13.8 3.2 1.20 1.57 5.89 
0.86 0.18 4.22 5.26 51 .3 20.9 7.6 0.4 16.3 ~.4 1.25 2.45 6.75 
0.90 0.20 4.61 5.71 45.5 26.3 8.4 0.5 15.8 3.5 1.24 1.73 5.42 
0.89 0.20 4.72 5.81 47.3 25.0 8.8 0.2 15.3 3.4 1.23 1.90 5.39 
0.78 0.18 3.58 4.54 52.9 16.7 9.0 0.2 17.2 4.0 1.27 3.16 5.85 
0.78 0.18 3.99 4.95 48.5 23.2 8.5 0.4 15.8 3.6 1.24 2.09 5.71 
0.90 0.20 4.10 5.20 52.9 16.5 9.2 0.2 17.3 3.8 1.27 3.20 5.73 
0.85 0.20 3.94 4.99 49.1 21.0 8.4 0.4 17.0 4.0 1.27 2.33 5.83 
0.96 0.23 4.50 5.69 51 .8 17.6 9.5 0,2 16.9 4.0 1.26 2.95 5.46 
0.91 0.20 4.99 6.10 45.9 27.0 8.5 0.3 14.9 3.3 1.22 1.70 5.38 
1.10 0.24 6.46 7.80 42 .3 32.7 7.2 0.6 14.1 3.1 1.21 1.29 5.89 
0.86 0.20 · 4.31 5.37 49.1 22.0 8.7 0.4 16.0 3.7 1.25 2.23 5.62 
2# East Open Cast Pit: Borehole Assay Results. 
5.4.3 Metallurgical Test Results 
The metallurgical test results were very disappointing. The metallurgists were not even able to 
provide a percentage recovery for the shallow ore". The medium depth ore showed a recovery 
of only 53.8% and the deep ore only 57% (Table 3.2). However, it was pointed out by the 
Metallurgical Manager that these results were minimum expected recoveries, based on 
applying the standard flotation method as applied to underground ore, to open cast samples. 
No attempt had been made to adjust the reagents used. A further problem was noted in that 
there was considerable resistance, on the part of the metallurgists, to having to process open 
cast ore. It was felt that it would create a greater workload for them and further stretch a 
fairly limited resource: themselves. This was complicated by identifying the relative positions 
of the samples and by not having had a control sample supplied by the geologist. 
At this point the Metallurgical Manager indicated a fair level of confidence in obtaining at least 
a 60% recovery. To maintain a degree of conservatism it was decided to use the metallurgical 
test result percentages of 54% for the shallow ore and 57% for the deep ore. 
5.4.4 Mineral Resource Statement 
In the underground environment, split reef areas (Figure 5.6) may be stoped where the internal 
waste (lens) is less than 50cm thick. Therefore, areas of split reef where the internal waste is 
less than 50cm in thickness are included in the ore resource statement. The grade is calculated 
over the entire width, including the internal waste, which effectively dilutes the grade. 
This same procedure was applied to the borehole data. Only two of the six split-reef boreholes 
contained split reef that was less than 50cm in thickness. Normally the boreholes with internal 
waste greater than 50cm would not be utilized in the estimation of the mineral resource, and 
would be written off as a geological loss. Due to the mining method employed in open cast 
mining, where the reef is essentially mined from above rather than from the side, as is the case 
in underground mining, there was a logical and intuitive argument to include at least the 
uppermost portion of split reef areas in the mineral resource statement. If the split reef area 
was potholed, the geological loss would be catered for by the normal allowances. Where the 
internal waste of split reef areas was sufficiently thick, it was felt that it might even be possible 
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to remove the internal waste and access the bottom portion of the reef as well, thus resulting 
in no loss, or a much reduced loss, of potential tonnage. 
In order that the entire open cast project data be directly comparable to data from other, 
.~ . 
competing, projects, the mineral resource statement was estimated in exactly the same manner 
as for underground ore, with the exception noted above. This data is presented in Figure 5.8. 
Obviously, in an open cast environment, there would be no need to leave pillars, so there are 
no losses attributed to support. The mineral resource estimate is based on 4 PGM's + Au, and 
the correction factor is a weighted average of the correction factors ofthe assay results. 
The mineral resource statement provides the pit tonnage, an estimate of tons to be sent to the 
mill (allowing for geological losses and dilution), an estimated mill head-grade as well as an 
estimate of the kilograms ofPGM produced in concentrate. 
5.4.5 Mining Costs 
In all, five open cast mining contractors were approached and requested to provide. quotations 
for the mining of the open pits. There were some stipulations from management, however. 
The primary and most important stipulation was that EPL wanted only one monthly billable 
item: tons of ore delivered as measured by the mine's weigh bridge. The company did not wish 
to have to perform survey measurements in the pits (see Chapter 2). This had been _a_ major 
point of contention when the previous open pits had been mined. Furthermore it was felt that 
billing in any other way made it difficult to fix a mining cost per ton of ore, as in any month 
material (waste) will be stripped from above reef that will only be mined at some later time. 
Secondly, the cost must include rehabilitation of the open cast area after mining has finished, 
but not revegetation. As EPL has extensive experience of re-vegetating open pits, it was felt 
that it could be performed more cost effectively by the mine. Thirdly the cost must be a 
"loaded" cost. EPL wished to award the contract of the ore to the local Bapo Ma-Mogale 
tribe, on whose behalf EPL mines, as part of an ongoing sodo-economic programme. The 
mining cost must therefore include the cost of loading the ore from a stockpile at the pit onto 
the contractor's transport trucks. 
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UG2 2# OPENCAST 
---
IN SITU SQUARE METRES 
NOT DISCOUNTED 
OR ADJUSTED 
BLOCK 
HORI- DIP ON PLANE 
ZONTAL OF REEF 
DEGR 
PROVED MINERAL RESERVE • 
2E1 1,855 15 1,920 
2E2 4,450 15 4,607 
2E3 4,685 15 4,850 
2E4 4,176 15 4,322 
2E5 3,020 15 3,127 
2E8 3,530 15 3,655 
2E7 5,460 15 5,653 
2EB 5,430 15 5,622 
2E9 5,110 15 5.290 
2El0 4,395 15 4,550 
2Ell 3,345 15 3,463 
2E12 5,150 15 5,332 
2E13 7,505 15 7,770 
2E14 7,290 15 7,547 
2E15 8,400 15 8,696 
2E18 9,190 15 9,514 
2E17 9,235 15 9,561 
2E18 6,320 15 6,543 
2Ela 5,660 15 5,860 
2E20 6,865 15 7,107 
2E21 6065 15 6,279 
2E22 4615 15 4,778 
TOTAL OPEN CAST 121 ,750 15 128,045 
TOTAL 2# O/CAST 121 ,750 1~ 126,045 
EPOG2f--------.--p~ Limit applied to Mill H .. d Grad. 
EASTERN PLA TlNUM LIMITED 
MINERAL RESOURCES STATEMENT FOR 2# EASTOPEN PIT AS AT 30 MAY 1996 
---------
GROUND LOSSES AVAILABLE FOR STOPING FACTOR FACTOR UNCORRECTED 
(PERCENTAGES) (IN SITU UNCORRECTED GRADE) FOR TONS OF IN SITU 25.0% CORR 
MILLED ESTIMATED GRADE TO 
PER TONNES BUILT UP MILL 
GEe- SUPPORT SQUARE CHANNEL CHANNEL GRAMS SQUARE SENT TO HEAD MILL CONTENTS 
LOGICAL METRES WIDTH DENSITY TONNES VALUE cmllA PER METRE MILL GRADE HEAD HEAD GRADE 
(em.) PG .... SQUARE BROKEN GRADE (KGS) 
(aJI) "'ETRE 
% % % 
10.00% 0.00% 1,728 158.9 3.790 10,409 3.72 591 22.4 6.7181 11,611 0.8179 3.04 35.329 3.80 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 4,146 137.3 3.790 21 ,576 3.76 516 19.6 5.9024 24,473 0.8179 3.08 75.262 3.84 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 4,365 107.4 3.790 17,769 4.05 435 16.5 4.7752 20,845 0.8179 3.31 69.049 4.14 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 3,890 108.0 3.790 15,923 4.46 482 18.3 4.7978 18,664 0.8179 3.65 68.082 4.56 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 2,814 141 .3 3.790 15,069 4.53 640 24.3 6.0534 17,033 0.8179 3.71 63.110 4.63 fpay) 
10.00% 0.00% 3,289 139.4 3.790 17,377 4.32 602 22.8 5.9816 19,674 0 .8179 3.53 69.515 4.42 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 5,087 147.9 3.790 28,517 4.47 661 25.1 6.3026 32,063 0.8179 3.66 117.224 4.57 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 5,059 148.8 3.790 28,533 4.43 659 25.0 6.3365 32,059 0.8179 3.62 116.160 4.53 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 4,761 176.1 3.790 31 .777 4.36 768 29.1 7.3681 35,081 0.8179 3.57 125.102 4.46 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 4,095 170.2 3.790 26,415 4.71 802 30.4 7.1451 29,259 0.8179 3.85 112.716 4.82 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 3,117 189.3 3.790 22,361 4.93 933 35.4 7.8672 24,520 0.8179 4.03 
. 
98.870 5.04 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 4,799 165.3 3.790 30,062 3.74 618 23.4 6.9599 33,397 0.8179 3.0? 102.160 3.82 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 6,993 156.5 3.790 41 ,477 3.79 593 22.5 6.6274 46,344 0.8179 3.10 143.659 3.87 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 6,792 104.9 3.790 27,005 4.06 426 16.1 4.6811 31 ,796 0.8179 3.32 105.585 4.15 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 7,827 51.1 3.790 15,158 4.86 248 9.4 2.6720 20,913 0.8179 3.97 83.129 4.97 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 8,563 115.6 3.790 37,516 4.55 526 19.9 5.0840 43,533 0.8179 3.72 162.007 4.65 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 8,605 163.6 3.790 53,353 4.10 671 25.4 6.8957 59,335 0.8179 3.35 198.973 4.19 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 5,889 147.6 3.790 32,941 4.35 642 24.3 6.2912 37,047 0.8179 3.56 131.808 4.45 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 5,274 140.4 3.790 28,062 4.50 632 23.9 6.0194 31 ,744 0.8179 3.68 116.837 4.60 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 6,396 146.5 3.790 35,515 5.30 776 29.4 6.2497 39,976 0.8179 4.33 173.290 5.42 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 5,651 163.0 3.790 34,911 4.87 794 30.1 6.8730 38,840 0.8179 3.98 154.705 4.98 (pay) 
10.00% 0.00% 4,300 179.3 3.790 29,221 4.89 877 33.2 7.4891 32,203 0.8179 4.00 128.798 5.00 (pay) 
1 
10.00% 0.00'4 113,440 147.6 3.7BO 800,845 4.41 850 23.3 6.8980 880,412 0.B178 3.80 2,461 .387 4 .80 (pay) 
10.00°4 0.00% 11 3,440 147.5 3.790 . 600,945 4.41 650 23.3 5.9980 680,412 0.8176 3.60 2,451.367 4.50 (pay) 
' .783 gtt corrected p:v,oiM~hnlc:.\op.nc •• t\2te •• t\ipug~,"'1 11 :08AM ~M"'96 
FIGURE 5.8 
Accommodation for the mining contractors' personnel would be provided by EPL at the 
existing hostel. This prevented the situation where EPL would invoice the contractor for 
accommodation costs, only to have it built into the cost/t, with the addition of a 20% 
administration fee. Although this cost is borne by EPL, it forms part of the sundry costs 
(variable) in the financial model. Various other operational stipulations were also made to the 
contractors. 
Obviously the first stipulation means that there is an increased risk to the contractor and 
indirectly to the geologist. It requires that the confidence level in, above all, the tonnage 
estimates must be high. If there is less tonnage in the pit than estimated, for whatever reason, 
the contractor's profit margin will be reduced. If there is more tonnage in the pit, the 
contractor will be quite happy as he can deliver more ore tonnage for the same amount of 
waste stripping, but the client will pay an unnecessarily high cost per ton for every ton of ore. 
In fact so onerous is this stipulation that one reputable contractor withdrew from the tender 
process because they were not prepared to carry that risk. The other contractors tendered on 
that basis and the costs ranged from ± R34/t of ore to ± R56/t of ore. 
5.4.6 Sundry Costs 
Some expenditure had at this stage been incurred by EPL, in the form of drilling and assay 
costs and some environmental work in terms of the Environmental Mine Programme Report 
required by law, would be necessary (Chapter 4). These were now defined as Sunk Costs. If 
the pit did not proceed these costs would be non-recoverable. In addition to this, and if the 
open cast mining costs went ahead, additional working costs would be incurred. These costs 
would be made up of in-pit sampling (assay costs), revegetation of the mined out areas, a 
grade control officer to control the ore grade as best as possible during mining, and damage 
provision for any damage that might occur to dwellings close to the proposed pit areas as a 
result of blasting. Additionally, the cost of hostel accommodation for the mining contractor's 
personnel would form part of these costs. These costs would vary in proportion to the tonnage 
removed, and are therefore deemed Variable Costs. A breakdown of these sundry costs is 
presented in Figure 5.9. The sunk costs and variable costs were estimated, and apportioned 
per ton of ore and appear on the template as Sundry Costs. At this stage sufficient information 
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PROPOSED 2# EAST OPEN-CAST 
Sundry Costs Breakdown 
Rand 
.~ 
MINING R I ton (of ore) 35.34 
TRANSPORT I ton 4.92 
MILLING I ton 17.44 ~ 
SMELTING I ton 6.50 
SUB-TOTAL: 64.20 
SUNK COSTS: 
DRILLING & DELINEATION 85,867 
EMPR BOREHOLES 53,770 
SUB-TOTAL: 139637 
SUNK COSTITON 0.21 
VARIABLE COSTS 
SAMPLINGN ALUATION 12,667 
HOSTEL COSTS 240,000 
RE-VEGETATION 22,249 
DAMAGE PROVISION 158,147 
GRADE-CONTROUGEOLOGIST 236,444 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS: 669,507 
TOTAL SUNDRY COSTS: 809144 
TONS (ORE) 680,412 
VARIABLE COST I ton 0.98 
TOTAL COSTS I ton 65.39 
FIGURE 5.9 
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with respect to costs, grade, tonnage and recoveries was available to return to the financial 
model template and re-examine the financial viability of the proposed open pits. 
5.5 Financial Model Template: 
All of the foregoing factors were finalized as follows: 
Reserve: 704 624t as estimated by the spreadsheet template. This estimated that some 
697 597t of ore would be sent to the mill and was acceptably close to the Mineral Resource 
Statement (Figure 5.8) estimated tonnage sent to the mill of680 412t. 
Geological losses: Due to the different mining method that would be employed, in open cast 
as opposed to underground mining, it was felt that there was considerable justification in 
expecting a greater extraction percentage from the open cast than is the case from 
underground. Because of the mining method, it is very often impossible (either physically or in 
terms of cost) to, for example, mine the base of a pothole, or often even the flanks of a 
pothole. In an open cast environment, however, potholes could be more extensively mined, 
except if they occur at or near the highwall. It was therefore decided to apply a factor of 10% 
for geological losses. 
Mining Dilution: It is essential to extract the bottom contact of the UG2, as the lowest 
portion of the UG2 contains the highest grade, frequently >20 g/t. It was therefore decided to 
allow for 10% dilution, essentially of footwall material. In underground stoping operations a 
similar footwall overbreak allowance is applied, and based on extensive sampling data, a value 
of 0.3 g/t is ascribed to this dilution. This value was also applied to dilution for the open cast 
ore. 
Recovery: A recovery of 54% was applied to the shallow ore (0-15m depth) and 57% to the 
deep ore (I5-30m) as per the metallurgical test results (Table 3.2). A smelter recovery of99% 
was applied. 
Sundry Costs: The sundry costs were estimated for the open cast and amounted to 
R809 144. A breakdown of these costs is presented in Figure 5.9. 
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Grade: The grade used is the estimated grade from the mineral resource statement (Figure 
5.8) of 4.41 g/t (3 PGM's + Au) which was then corrected by the correction factor of 25%, 
giving a 5 PGM + Au grade of 5.51 g/t. 
Matte Valuation: At this stage it was decided to use a Matte Valuation ofR33 208/kg, the 
April 1996 matte valuation figure based on the then current PGM prices and a $:R exchange 
rate of$4.3725:Rl. This matte valuation includes Rh. 
-Mining Costs: The tendered mining cost ofR35.34/t of ore used in the template. 
Note: At this point it was discovered that the previously used smelting costlt was wrong. 
Where a cost of R5. OOlt had been used in the first pass analysis, the final analysis used a cost 
ofR6.501t of ore. 
The formulae used in the financial template are presented in Appendix 1. 
5.5.1 Results: 
The financial template was run using all the above factors and the results are presented in 
Figure 5.10. This template also shows the estimated costs and profits for average recoveries of 
59%-62%. These were included because the recovery percentage predicted were deemed to 
be the least dependably defined of all the factors. Despite the conservatism applied in all of 
these factors, the results were very promising. The gross revenue was estimated to be 
R64 103 332 against a gross cost ofR 45 593 636, giving a gross profit ofR18 509696. No 
allowance was made for tax, as all financial estimates performed within the Lonrho Group are 
done in gross terms. The cost/kg of PGM in matte was estimated to be R23 619, against a 
matte valuation ofR33 208, giving a gross profit/kg ofR9 589. The margin, calculated on the 
basis of gross profit expressed as a percentage of gross revenue, is 29%. Some other analyses 
were attempted, such as calculating an IRR, but the result (8787%) were felt to be somewhat 
meaningless. Two specific problems exist in calculating the IRR: firstly the short life of the pit 
(± 18 months) and secondly the very low capital outlay ±R140 000 which combine to make 
these measures effectively useless. An NPV was calculated and the result, at 10% p.a. 
discount rate, amounted to R16 177450. 
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FIGURE 5.10 
2# EAST OPEN CAST: FINAL FINANCIAL TEMPLATE 
RESERVES (tons) 
GEOLOGIC AL LOSS 
ML"IEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUTION 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
RESERVES (tons) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
MINEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUTIOl'i 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
REEF TONS 
MILLED TONS 
TO:\'SMINED 
PGE kg in conc. 
PGEGRADE 
PGE kg in matte 
MATTE VALUATION 
ON-MINE COSTS 
MINING/t 
MILLING/t 
SMELTING COST/t 
TRANSPORT @42cltlkm 
PRESUMPTIONS: Matte Valuation R33 2081kg 
Dilution grade 0.3 g/t 
Mining costs R35.34/t of ore 
Mining Depth: 30mbs 
Rand/$: R4.3725:$1 
Predicted 
Recovery 
59% 
Recovery 
0-15 m 352,312 352,312 
10.0% 35,231 35,231 
(ORE) 317,081 317,081 
10% 31,708 31,708 
54% 59% 
kg 949 1036 
15-30 m 352312 352312 
10.0% 35231 35231 
(ORE) 317081 317081 
10°/. 31708 31708 
57% 59% 
kg 1001 1036 
TOTAL 704,624 704,624 
697,578 697,578 
5,120,283 5,120,283 
1950 2073 
g/t 5.51 5.51 
kg 1930 2052 
RIkg 33,208 33,208 
Rand 35.34 35.34 
Rand 17.44 17.44 
Rand 6.50 6.50 
Rand 4.92 4.92 
TOTAL COSTS/t OF ORE Rand 65.36 65.36 
REVENUE/t Rand 91.89 97.69 
SUNDRY COSTS Rand 809,144 809,144 
GROSS REVENUE Rand 64,103,332 68,145,884 
GROSS COSTS Rand 45,593,636 45,593,636 
GROSS PROFIT/t Rand 26.53 32.33 
GROSS PROFIT (TOTAL) Rand 18,509,696 22,552,248 
COSTIkg Rand 23,619 22,218 
PROFIT/kg Rand 9,589 10,990 
MARGIN % Rand 29% 33% 
dissur - 119197 97 
60% 
Recoverv 
352,312 
35,231 
317,081 
31,708 
60% 
105.t 
352312 
35231 
317081 
31708 
60% 
105.t 
704,624 
697,578 
5,120,283 
2108 
5.51 
2087 
33,208 
35.34 
17.44 
6.50 
4.92 
65.36 
99.35 
809,144 
69,300,899 
45,593,636 
33.99 
23,707,263 
21,848 
11,360 
34% 
61% 
Recovetv 
352,312 
35,231 
317,081 
31,708 
61% 
1072 
352312 
35231 
317081 
31708 
61% 
1072 
704,62.t 
697,578 
5,120,283 
2143 
5.51 
2122 
33,208 
35.34 
17.44 
6.50 
4.92 
65.36 
101.00 
809,144 
70,455,914 
45,593,636 
35.64 
24,862,278 
21,490 
11,718 
35% 
.. 
62% 
Recoverv 
352,312 
35,231 
317,081 
31,708 
62% 
1089 
352312 
35231 
317081 
31708 
62% 
1089 
704,62.t 
697,578 
5,120,283 
2178 
5.51 
2156 
33,208 
- . 
35.34 
17..t4 
6.50 
4.92 
65.36 
102.66 
809,144 
71,610,929 
.t5,593,636 
37.30 
26,017,293 
21,143 
12,065 
36% 
Due to the short life of the pit the next step was to produce a month by month cash flow for 
the pit. Despite the effort and cost expended on defining the mineral resource of the pit, 
conservatism was urged in the estimation of a cash flow. Experience with the two previous 
pits had shown that the actual tonnage extracted always was less that was predicted. This 
meant that some of the sunk costs and even some of the variable costs were left uncovered. 
F or this reason it was decided to use the more conservative tonnage figure from the mineral 
resource statement, of 680 412t, and to cover all of the sundry costs (based on the estimated 
tonnage) in the first half of the pit's life. At a required tonnage of 40 OOOt/month delivered, the 
pit had a life of±18 months. The cash flow must also reflect the build-up of tonnage from the 
pit and the run-down of the tonnage towards the end of the pit life. This is presented in Figure 
5.11. By loading all of the sundry costs onto the tonnage mined during the first ten months of 
the pit life, it was felt that the risk of mining out the pit (at a reduced tonnage) and still having 
outstanding sundry costs which had not been covered, was greatly reduced. The differences 
between the results on Figure 5. 10 and Figure 5.11 are due to different tonnages being used. 
However, it must be remembered that the open cast tonnage would be displacing potential 
underground tonnage, which, while having a similar grade, would yield higher recoveries. If 
the same tonnage as was expected from the open cast was sourced from underground it would 
yield 3 096kg in matte (5.36g/t x 704 624t x 82.8% x 99%). At R33 208/kg, this would 
provide a revenue ofR102.81 million, with costs ofR70.76 million, yielding a gross profit of 
R32.05 million. The theoretical difference in gross profit between this and the gross profit of 
the open cast is some R 13.54 million. This is based on the assumption that all factors would 
remain equal (matte valuation, mining costs, processing costs, etc.). 
This meant that a strategic decision was required because, should the underground production 
recover, the logical action would be to close the pit and process the underground ore. To 
close the pit with only a portion of the tonnage extracted would effectively sterilize the 
remaining resource there, due to technicalities in the mining plan and EMPR /requirements. A 
decision to proceed with the pit required commitment to see the mining through to 
completion. This required a close examination of production trends, planned production, 
public holidays, official shutdowns, etc., across the entire Lonrho Group platinum mines. This 
was done and it was decided to proceed with the 2# East Pit. 
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2# EAST OPEN PIT: MONTHLY CASH FLOW (CONSTANT MONEY TERMS) 
, 
Milled Gross ew kg ' Cost/kg st/To Revenue Profit Profit Cumulative 
Tons Costs n Matt Rand Rand per Month per Month per kq Profit 
Month 1 5 , 000 332 , 900 13 . 699 24 , 301 66.58 454 , 916 122 , 016 8 , 907 122 , 016 
Month 2 20 , 000 1 , 331 , 600 54 . 796 24 , 301 66.58 1 , 819 , 666 488 , 066 8 , 907 610 , 082 
Month 3 35 , 000 2 , 330 , 300 95 . 893 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 184 , 415 854 , 115 8 , 907 1 , 464 , 197 
Month 4 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 2 , 440 , 328 
Month 5 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 3 , 416 , 459 
Month 6 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 30 1 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 4 , 392 , 590 
Month 7 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 5 , 368 ,1721 
Month 8 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 6 , 344 , 852 
Month 9 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 7 , 320 , 984 
Month 10 40 , 000 2 , 663 , 200 109 . 592 24 , 301 66.58 3 , 639 , 331 976 , 131 8 , 907 8 , 297 , 115 
Month 11 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 109 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 r"77 6 9 , 368 , 446 
Month 12 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 109 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 , 776 10 , 439 , 777 
Month 13 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 1 09 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 , 776 11 , 511 , 108 
Month 14 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 1 09 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1, 071 , 331 9 , 776 12 , 582 , 439 
Month 15 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 109 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 , 776 13 , 653 , 770 
Month 16 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 109 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 , 776 14 , 725 , 101 
Month 17 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 109 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 , 776 15 , 796 , 433 
Month 18 40 , 000 2 , 568 , 000 109 . 592 23 , 432 64.20 3 , 639 , 331 1 , 071 , 331 9 , 776 16 , 867 , 764 , 
Month 19 20 , 412 1 , 310 , 450 55 . 925 23 , 432 64.20 1 , 857 , 157 546 , 707 9 , 776 17 , 414 , 471 
TOTALS : ~80,412 44 , 491 , 650 1864 61 , 906 , 121 1 7 , 414 , 471 17,414,471 
* COST/TON: Includes mining costs , sunk costs , variable costs , transport , milling costs and smelting 
FIGURE 5.11 
5.6 UG2 and Merensky Open Cast Pits: A Comparison. 
To date, Lomho has not mined any of their extensive Merensky reserves by open cast 
methods. The reasons for this are manifold, but· the overriding consideration has been the 
mineralogy of the Merensky Reef in the near sUrl-ace environment. There is also a large degree 
of "wait-and-see" what their competitors will do. 
An area of Merensky Reef, thought to be suitable for open cast mining was delineated on 
EPI., although at present EPL does not mine the Merensky Reef from underground. As EPL 
does not produce any Merensky Reef, a surcharge is levied by the smelter to cover the cost of 
sulfides added in the smelting stage. The reasons for this are complex and due to internal 
costing structures. Were EPL to produce its own Merensky reef, this surcharge would be 
dropped or reduced, and the overall cost of smelting would be reduced. There was also a 
problem with keeping one of the Merensky plants full, due to various operational problems, so 
a "window of opportunity" existed. 
An analysis, similar in most respects to that for the UG2, was performed (Figure 5.12). 
Initially, the metallurgists felt that recovery could be as high as 84%. After discussions with 
Amplats, on their Merensky open cast operations at Bleskop, it was felt that it would be more 
realistic to apply a recovery of 64% as WPL could batch mill open cast ore (Chapter 2). With 
a Matte Valuation ±50% higher than that of the UG2 (Table 5.3), it was expected ~hat the 
Merensky would be a viable open cast project. The mining costs worked out to some R56/t of 
ore. Grades (in situ) were available from the mineral resource document. 
Initially, the results looked promising (Figure 5.12) and the go-ahead was given to perform 
diamond drilling and to define the mineral resource, along the same lines as for the UG2. The 
results were, however, very disappointing, giving an average grade for the boreholes drilled of 
2.49 g/t over a cut of 100cm. The area is also transected by a number of large ( 40m wide) 
dykes, which appear to have metasomatized the adjoining Merensky Reef, causing extensive 
replacement and alteration. The sulfide content looked reasonably good in fresh intersections. 
This information was fed back into the financial template (Figure 5.13), and it was realized 
that the project was not viable. At this point in time a strategic decision was taken to 
concentrate on the UG2 projects. 
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FIGURE 5.12 
FIRST PASS FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED MERENSKY OPEN CAST PIT 
RESERVES (fONS) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
~llNEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUTION 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
RESERVES (fONS) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
MI:\,EABLE TONS 
MINING DILUTION 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
REEF TONS 
MILLED TONS 
TONS MINED 
PGE in cone. 
PGEGRADE 
PGEin matte 
MATTE VAL $/oz 
ON-MINE COSTS 
MINING/t 
MILLING/t 
SMEL TING COSTS/t 
TRANSPORT @42c/tlkm 
TOTAL COSTS/t OF ORE 
REVE!\'UE/t 
SUl';l)RY COSTS 
GROSS REVEl'.'UE 
GROSS COSTS 
GROSS PROFIT/t 
GROSS PROFIT (fOTAL) 
Cost/kg 
Profit/kg 
Margin % 
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PRESUMPTIONS: Matte Valuation R39 OOOlkg (February 1996) 
0-15m 
10% 
(ORE) 
10% 
kg 
15-25 m 
10% 
(ORE) 
10% 
kg 
TOTAL 
kg 
g/t 
kg 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Dilution grade 0.3 g/t 
64% 
R ecovery 
383 590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
63% 
1037 
255,726 
51,145 
204,581 
20,458 
63% 
615 
639,316 
604 793 
8,676,215 
1652 
4.74 
1636 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
105.48 
572,927 
63,792,965 
58,856,543 
8.16 
4,936,422 
35,982 
3,018 
8% 
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Mining costs R55.00/t of ore 
Mining Depth: 25mbs 
R:$ Exchange Rate: R3.7:S1 
65% 
R ecovery 
383 590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
64% 
1054 
255,726 
51145 
204,581 
20458 
64% 
625 
639,316 
604 793 
8,676,215 
1,678 
4.74 
1662 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
107.15 
572,927 
64,805552 
58,856,543 
9.84 
5,949,009 
35,420 
3,580 
10% 
65% 
R ecovery 
383,590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
65% 
1070 
255,726 
51,145 
204,581 
20,458 
65% 
634 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
1,705 
4.74 
1688 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
108.83 
572,927 
65,818,138 
58,856,543 
11.51 
6,961,596 
34,875 
4,125 
12% 
660/0 
Recoverv 
383,590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
66% 
1087 
255,726 
51,145 
204,581 
20,458 
66% 
644 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
1,731 
4.74 
1714 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
110.50 
572,927 
66,830,725 
58,856,543 
13.18 
7,974,182 
34,347 
4,653 
14% 
67 % 
Recovery 
383,590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
67% 
1103 
255,726 
51,145 
204,581 
20,458 
67% 
654 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
1,757 
4.74 
1740 
328.86 
-4:05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
112.18 
572,927 
67,843,312 
58,856,543 
14.86 
8,986,769 
33,834 
5,166 
15% 
FIGURE 5.13 
FINAL FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED MERENSKY OPEN CAST PIT 
RESERVES (TONS) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
:\lIlIIEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUTION 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
RESERVES (TONS) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
MINEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUTION 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
REEF TONS 
MILLED TONS 
TONS MINED 
PGE inconc. 
PGEGRADE 
PGEinmatte 
MATTE VAL $/oz 
ON-MINE COSTS 
MINING/t 
MILLING/t 
SMELTING COSTS/t 
TRANSPORT @42c/tIkm 
TOTAL COSTS/t OF ORE 
REVENUE/t 
SUNDRY COSTS 
GROSS REVENUE 
GROSS COSTS 
GROSS PROFIT/t 
GROSS PROFIT (TOTAL) 
Cost/kg 
Profit/kg 
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PRESUMPTIONS: Matte Valuation R39 OOOIkg (February 1996) 
0-15m 
10% 
(ORE) 
10% 
kg 
IS-25m 
10% 
(ORE) 
10% 
kg 
TOTAL 
kg 
g/t 
kg 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Rand 
Dilution grade 0.3 g/t 
Mining costs R55.00/t of ore 
Minjng Depth: 25mbs 
R:$ Exchange Rate: R3.7:S1 
-< 
64% 
R ecovery 
383,590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
63% 
~8 
255,726 
51,145 
204,581 
20,458 
63% 
325 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
873 
2.49 
864 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
55.72 
572,927 
33,701,944 
58,856,543 
-41.59 
-25,154,599 
68,109 
-29,109 
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65% 
R ecovery 
383,590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
64% 
557 
255,726 
51,145 
204,581 
20,458 
64% 
330 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
887 
2.49 
878 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
56.61 
572,927 
34,236,895 
58,856,543 
-40.71 
-24,619,647 
67,045 
-28,045 
65% 
R ecoverv 
383,590 
38,359 
345,231 
34,523 
65% 
565 
255,726 
51,1~5 
204,581 
20,458 
65% 
335 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
901 
2.49 
892 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
57.49 
572,927 
34,771,847 
58,856,5~3 
-39.82 
-24,084,696 
66,013 
-27,013 
66% 
R ecoverv 
383,590 
38,359 
- . 
3~5,231 
3~,523 
66% 
57~ 
255,726 
51,1~5 
204,581 
20,458 
66% 
340 
639,316 
604,793 
8,676,215 
914 
2.49 
905 
328.86 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
58.38 
572,927 
35,306,798 
58,856,543 
-38.94 
-23,549,745 
65,013 
-26,013 
67% 
Recoverv 
383,590 
38,359 
3~5,231 
3~,523 
67% 
583 
255,726 
51,1~5 
204,581 
20,458 
67% 
345 
639,316 
604,793 
,-
8,676,215 
928 
2.49 
919 
328.86 
- ' 
4.05 
15.97 
15.96 
6.30 
96.37 
59.26 
572,927 
_ 35,841,750 
58,856,5~3 
-38.05 
-23,014,793 
64,043 
-25,043 
-5.6.1 Merensky Open Cast on Western Platinum Ltd. 
An exercise, similar in most respects to that performed on the UG2 at EPL, was performed on 
a potential Merensky open cast area on Western Platinum Mine. The area was drilled and the 
boreholes sampled. Due to core loss in the dia~ond drill holes there was little confidence in 
the results of this drilling. The areas was therefore trenched down to a depth of ± 7m and the 
Merensky sampled in these trenches. The sampling results from the trenches were reasnonable 
and it was decided to obtain a bulk: sample (±5 OOOt) to enable metallurgical testwork to be 
pefformed on a production scale. 
The Merensky Reef, being a feldspathic pyroxenite or pegmatoidal feldspathic pyroxenite, 
tends to form clay minerals on weathering, which have a deleterious effect on the flotation 
process, and therefore creates major problems for the metallurgists (see Chapter 3). Another 
problem identified is that the proportions of metals contained in the weathered environment 
tends to be quite different to the Merensky in the unweathered environment. On first 
examination of these differences it could be thought that this process has in fact improved the 
oxidized Merensky Reef (Table 5.3). The Pt and Au content of the ore is enri~hed at the 
expense of Pd. In terms of revenue, this should improve the matte valuation for this ore. Pt 
forms some 77% of the contained metal and Au forms 10% of the contained metal, while Pd 
Table 5.3 
Comparative Merensky & UG2 Matte Valuations 
Merensky Merensky UG2 UG2 Open 
Underground Open Cast Ore Underground Cast Ore 
Ore Ore 
Pt $380.50/0z 59.5% 77.5% 49.5% 48.6% 
Pd $U6.00/0z 25.0% 10.2% 23.8% 22.6% 
Au $379.45/0z 5.0% 10.0% 0.4% 0.4% 
Rh $240.00/0z 2.9% 0..+% 8.7% 8·.7% 
Ru $50.00/0z 6.2% 1.0% 14.0% 16.0% 
Ir $65.00/0z 1.4% 1.0% 3.6% 3.7% 
Ni $7,162.50/t 265.44 kglkg PGM 27.92 kg/kg PGM 23.56 kglkg PGM 24.62 kglkg PGM 
CU $1941.50/t 181.66 kglkg PGM 20 9-l kg/kg PGM 13 .06 kglkg PGM 12.41 kglkg PGM 
Matte R43,559/kg R47,491 /kg R32,663 /kg R32,101 .'kg 
Valuation 
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forms just over 10%, and Rh is also low. As Pt and Au are the two most valuable metals, the 
matte valuation was in excess ofR47 OOO/kg at the then current metal prices. 
Other problems also exist. The hanging wall succession of the Merensky Reef is a sequence of 
ii: • 
mottled and spotted anorthosites, which are remarkably fresh right up to outcrop. Indeed, they 
tend to form the only outcrop close to the Merensky Reef This hanging wall succession 
requires blasting from outcrop which increases the mining costs. The areas of Merensky Reef 
available for open cast mining are of the Western Platinum Merensky facies (Davey, 1993), 
which is a relatively thick (3-Sm) feldspathic pyroxenite, within which the PGM mineralization 
is essentially cryptic. This means that grade control within the pit would be required to 
determine the selection of ore from within a homogeneous rock type that has been shattered 
and confused by blasting and removal of the hanging wall succession. 
The next problem, that of the degree to which the Merensky Reef is weathered in the near 
surface environment, causes several problems. Firstly, there is the problem of proving mineral 
resources as diamond drill core recovery is generally quite poor. Secondly, and as discussed 
previously, the problem of selective mining of a weathered and highly friable ore zpne~ having 
blasted the overlying hanging wall rocks, is extremely difficult. Thirdly, the metallurgical 
problems of extracting the PGM's in the virtual absence of sulfides must be overcome. 
The drilling problem could be overcome possibly by large hole diametre drilling or_reverse 
circulation drilling. The later was attempted on the Merensky Reef but unfortunately at the 
time of writing, those results are not yet available. 
The virtual absence (Table S.3) of sulfides would mean that visual identification of ore will be 
almost impossible. All of these factors would mean that extensive drilling and sampling (of 
SMU's in the region of S x S x 1m) would have to be conducted and that the mining cycle 
would therefore have to be 2-3 days to allow for the return of assay results. This is a very real 
problem as the Merensky pyroxenite in this area is 3m to Sm thick, with only 1m to l.4m of 
economic PGM mineralization within it. Even in unweathered underground workings visual 
identification of the merensky "Reef' is often impossible. The pit would be too small to 
facilitate this, as the mining rate would effectively be reduced to 10 000t-1S OOOt/month. 
Furthermore, due to lower specific gravity of the Merensky Reef compared to the UG2, the 
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mining cost is higher. The lower specific gravity means that fewer tons of ore are extracted 
per unit area, and as the hanging wall rocks are very similar in specific gravity to those of the 
UG2, the stripping ratio and hence the cost increases. 
To some extent these problems can be quantifi~d by bulk sampling, which was performed at 
Western Platinum Ltd .. However, this is a very expensive exercise, as the pit must first be 
designed, and the box cut placed. The reason for this is that if the pit goes ahead, the box cut 
can then be used for the production mining of the pit. At Western Platinum, this was done and 
a 5- 700t bulk sample of the Merensky Reef removed, sampled and processed at a concentrator 
plant. This yielded a recovery of 15-20% in a plant that historically yields 97% recovery. 
When processing this ore, the plant was adversely affected due to the occurrence of sliming. 
The cost of mining for this bulk sample was R314 000. 
However, the sulfide content, and hence the Ni-Cu values (Table 5.3), is very low, being of 
the same order of magnitude as in the normal, underground, UG2 ore. The combination of the 
low sulfide content and the presence of significant amounts of clay minerals means that the 
flotation process for this ore has very low recoveries. So, despite the exceedingly. attractive 
matte-valuation of more than R47 OOO/kg, the Merensky on WPL in just not viable. The matte 
valuation is based on assay values, not on metallurgically recoverable PGM's. If the 
metallurgical problems can be resolved, the Merensky Reef on WPL may become a viable 
operation. Extensive test work at Mintek and within Lonrho has led to the developm~nt of a 
process whereby a recovery of ± 50% could be expected. Considering the low in situ grade 
(3.76 glt) and the problems outlined above, the Merensky is not really a viable proposition on 
the Lonrho properties at present. 
It has been suggested that this Merensky ore could be treated with UG2 ore (because of its 
low sulfide tenor), but as LPD only really mines the Merensky Reef for its sulfides to act as 
collectors for PGM's of the UG2 in the smelting process, this did not make the project any 
more attractive. 
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5.7 Results of Mining 2# East UG2 Open Cast Pit: 
Work began on the 2# East pit in June 1996, when the contractors came on site. The pit was 
laid out and stripping of the topsoil commenced; followed by waste rock removal from the 
box-cut. Towards the end of July, the first o;e' was produced from the pit. By the end of 
August the pit had reached full production of 40 OOOt/month. From August through to 
December 1996, production has ranged between 40 OOOt and 68 OOOt/month. The reason for 
this is a requirement on the part of the mine that there be a stockpile of at least 40 OOOt for the 
Christmas period mining closed own, during which time the concentrator will continue to 
operate. Waste mining at the pit has ranged between 210 OOOt and 230 OOOt/month. 
By August 1996, underground production had picked up to record levels. There appears to be 
no rational explanation for this, although there are several sciolists who gladly accept credit 
for the up-swing. This appeared to pose somewhat of a problem as, strictly speaking, the mine 
no longer needed the tonnage from the open cast operation. However, a significant level of 
commitment existed to see the pit through to completion. A decision was taken in September 
1996 to build a substantial stockpile of ore to see the concentrator through t~eplanned 
Christmas closedown. Furthermore, other mines in the Lonrho Group had excess concentrator 
capacity and began to take delivery of ore from EPL, for both immediate milling purposes and 
to build stockpiles for the Christmas period. 
For the first time in several years the EPL concentrator has successfully milled through the 
Christmas mining shutdown without running out of ore to mill, and indeed have broken milling 
records over that period. This is something that has never before occurred and it is due, to a 
large extent, to the availability of ore from the 2# East open cast pit. 
The open cast ore has been batch-milled at EPL in campaigns ranging in length from two to 
ten days since July 1996. The results for the period July to November 1996 are presented in 
Table 5.4 below. The December 1996 figures will only be available in mid-January 1997. 
At this point in time, with only some 20% of the pit tonnage having been milled and 
processed, 28% of the expected kilograms have been recovered. If the pit continues to 
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perform as it has for the first five months, the gross profit will be R3 8. 151 million, some 
R19.641 million more than projected. 
TABLt: .5.4 
2# East Open Cast Pit Results: July-November 1996 
Tons Mill Head Actual kgPGM Cost:- Profit: 
Milled Grade Recov~ry Produced Rand/k~ Rand/kg 
.ruly 13,180 4.63 69.3% 60.96 14,071 18,884 
August 15,134 4.57 61.2% 69.1 15,049 18,117 
September 18,229 4.4 58.7% 80.28 15,770 15,685 
October 50,731 4.11 60.4% 208.54 17,261 15,402 
November 41,165 4.86 68.7% 121.46 24,304 6,093 
TOTALS: 140,439 540.339k~ 
Weighted 4.40 glt 62.7% R17,980 R14,092 
Averages: 
The October and November data quoted in Table 5.4 are somewhat anomalous and, require 
some explanation. The kilograms recovered reported are impossibly high, taking toe tonnage 
and grade into account. The reason for this anomalously high figure of 208 kg, is a function of 
metals' accounting and allocation practices. During the period July to September 1996, the 
LPD smelter and base metal refinery complex under-recovered PGM's, which then was 
recovered from lock-up in October 1996. During October, the smelters reported a recovery of 
125%. This represents a ± 99% recovery for October production plus excess metal that had 
been locked up in the system for several months prior to that. The locked-up metal is 
apportioned to each operation on a pro rata basis. Had this lock-up not occurred, the 
kilograms produced for each of the first three months would have been slightly higher, and the 
kilograms produced for October would have been slightly lower. In November, the smelters 
reported a net recovery of only 75%, and hence there is once again an under-recovery of 
PGM's, which will be credited to the pit at some later date. 
From an operational point of view, the open cast pit has been performing very well, and in 
terms of this a number of points merit some discussion: 
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~ Geological Losses: 
To date, virtually no geological losses have been incurred. Several small potholes have been 
exposed and, after investigation, were discovered to contain UG2 Chromitite at their base. 
This chromitite was often substantially thicker than normal, sometimes exceeding 2.0m in 
",t. • 
thickness. This material has successfully been extracted in all cases thus far. 
~ Split Reef: 
Split reef has, unfortunately, been a common feature of the pit in the area mined to date. 
However, through careful management and vigilance, both on the part of the mine and the 
contractors, the internal waste of the UG2 in these areas has been extracted separately from 
the UG2. In all cases, both the top and bottom portions of the UG2 in split reef areas have 
been mined and sent to the mill. It will be remembered that the bottom portion of the UG2 in 
known split reef areas was not included in the Mineral Resource Statement for the open cast 
operation. The fact that it is successfully being mined will have the effect of increasing the ore 
tonnage from the pit, without materially affecting the stripping ratio. At present the west face 
is advancing into an area known to contain a large proportion of split reef (Figure 5.7), in 
which the internal waste is up to 3. Om thick, and at this stage there is a fair level of confidence 
in being able to successfully remove both the top and bottom portions of the UG2, with 
minimal dilution. 
~ Grade: 
In-pit sampling, based on 127 sections, indicates an in situ grade of 3.87 g/t, (4.84 g/t 
corrected) and truck sampling indicates a head grade of 4.38 g/t. Every face is sampled prior 
to blasting. These figures correlate very well with the predicted head grade (Figure 5.8). 
~ Dilution: 
Dilution of the run-of-mine ore from the pit is measured to be <5% of ore delivered .. In the pit, 
the percentage may be a little higher but waste "picking" is performed on the ore after blasting 
and on the stockpiles at the pit that has the effect of reducing waste presentations. 
~ Blasting: 
To date only two waste blasts have been necessary. However, and despite the weathered 
nature of the UG2 close to surface, most of the UG2 (60-70%) so far extracted, has required 
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light blasting before removal could be effected. No complaints have been received from local 
communities or residents in respect of blast damage or noise. 
~ Faulting: 
Several small faults have been negotiated in the pit since it began. Most faults encountered so 
far have been normal faults with a N-S strike, and vertical displacements of up to 1. Om. One 
exception to this was a very low-angle reverse fault «10°), also trending N-S,which caused a 
considerable gain of ground, throughout its entire exposure in the pit (±IOOm). In places along 
a ±20m wide N-S trending zone, a stoping width of >2.5m existed and was successfully 
mined. 
~ Landfill: 
Landfill is ongoing. The box-cut is, at the time of writing, back in place with the Modderspruit 
river-bed re-instated. Recent rain has caused this stream to flow, and the flow successfully 
traversed the rehabilitated/re-instated section across the pit, with no problems reported and 
without flooding the working pits. 
~ Concentrator Recoveries: 
The average recovery (weighted) reported by the plant, is 62.7%, some 7.5% better than 
predicted. There appears to be a definite correlation between percentage recovery and the 
duration of the milling campaigns: the longer the campaign, the higher the recovery. Although 
it was planned that the shallow (0-I5m) ore and the deep (IS-30m) should be milled in 
separate campaigns, due to the fact that they should be treated differently, it has been found 
that this is not necessarily true. Therefore, the deep and shallow ores are often blended, with 
little detrimental effect on recoveries discernible. Sliming in the concentrator has been a 
problem when shallow open cast ore has been campaigned for longer than 3-4 days on its 
own. 
5.7.1 Production Costs and Profitability: 
Although, and as has been noted earlier, the small open cast operations do not carry a portion 
of the total mine overhead, due to their relatively short-term nature, it is worthwhile examining 
their production costs and profitability compared to that of underground operations. Table 5.5 
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below is a simple comparison of these data for a five month period on EPL. However, these 
data are at the core of the business: minimizing costs and maximizing profits. 
, . 
TABLE 5.5 
Comparison of cost and profit data for underground and open cast production 
U nder ~round Open Cast 
- Costlkg Profitlkg Costlkg Profitlkg 
July '96 R20,703 R12,828 R14,071 R18,884 
August '96 R23 ,744 R 9,957 R15,049 R18,117 
September '96 R20,714 Rll ,258 R15,770 R15,685 
October '96 R31 ,933 R 332 R17,261 R15,402 
November '96 R27,871 R 3,014 R24,304 R 6,093 
Averages: R24,993 R 7,478 R17,979 R14,092 
Given the current recoveries, of 62.7%, and despite being ± 7% over budget mainly due to the 
cost of stockpiles, the open cast operation is far more profitable, ton-for-ton, than the 
underground operations. Note also that the high costlkg for November is due to the smelter 
under-recovery discussed above. This figure will be 'normalized' once the metal currently 
locked up, is released. 
The 2# East Pit is performing far better than predicted in terms of costlkg and profitlkg. The 
predicted costlkg was R23 619/kg, which is R5 640/kg more than the average current cost. 
The predicted profitlkg was R9 589/kg, which is R4 503/kg less than the current average 
figure of R14 092/kg. To a large extent the performance is due to two factors : firstly the 
better than predicted recovery at the concentrator, and secondly, the high degree of 
conservatism applied in the pre-feasibility and feasibility work. 
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Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 
6.0 Conclusions 
6.1 Future Potential for Open Cast Mining in the Bushveld Complex 
Small scale open cast mining of the UG2, and the Merensky Reef has proved itself to - be feasible and profitable. It enjoys a number of advantages which will be, and are 
being, exploited. It provides a readily available, and often as yet unexploited, 
resource that was previously thought to be unexploitable. It can be brought into production 
rapidly, as shown in Chapter 5. It requires little or no capital, if contract mining is employed. 
The problems of ( comparatively) low grade and low metallurgical recoveries are more than 
offset by very low mining costs. The metallurgical treatment costs are similar to those 
incurred by underground ore. The technology, knowledge and experience now exists to 
facilitate the profitable mining and treatment of shallow Merensky and UG2 ores. Viewed 
against a background of low metal prices and low underground productivity, the prospect of 
mining these resources must continue to be very attractive. 
There has been a sudden and great interest in exploiting these shallow reserves in the western 
Bushveld Complex during 1996. This interest will probably remain focused on the }Vestern 
Bushveld because of a number of factors. Firstly, because that is where most of the 
concentrators are, and the scale of mining being considered here is opportunistic. The 
concentrator and mining capacity in the western Bushveld far exceeds that of the eastern 
Bushveld, and therefore more opportunity exists in the western Bushveld for small scale open 
cast pits to redress production shortfalls. Secondly, the combination of physiographic and 
structural factors tend to favour the western Bushveld. In general terms, the topography tends 
to be flatter and more uniform in the western Bushveld than in the eastern Bushveld. The dip 
of both the UG2 and the Merensky tends to be flatter in the western Bushveld than in the 
eastern Bushveld, while the ore thicknesses remain much the same. These factors would 
severely limit the profitability of small pit in the eastern Bushveld. However, some scope exists 
in the eastern Bushveld for this, especially at the start-up stage of underground mining. 
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Lonrho is currently mining two small UG2 open cast pits, with two more planned over the 
next two years (Figure 2.1). There is also the possibility that a third UG2 pit will be mined 
during that period. The possibility of mining shallow Merensky resources is still a possibility, 
though remote, but work is ongoing on this. In the" medium term, Lonrho has a 4 km stretch of 
virgin ground, at Middlekraal (Figure 2.1), with both UG2 and Merensky open cast potential. 
This, it is felt will only be exploited once the planned shaft system there is begun, and will 
reduce the capital requirements considerably, by providing ore from t~e beginning of the 
project, even before the shafts begin to produce ore from underground. 
Amplats too, seems convinced of the benefits of exploiting shallow Merensky and UG2 
resources, previously ignored. The Bleskop pit at Rustenburg Section (Figure 6.1), the first of 
their recent forays into small scale open cast mining in the western Bushveld, is nearing 
completion. Amplats have recently announced a further R200 million investment in PPRust 
(Potgietersrus Platinum, Figure 6.1), which will facilitate a doubling of production there. 
While strictly not comparable to the type and scale of operation being examined here, it is, and 
will become an increasingly important factor in the PGM supply industry, simply because it 
can react to the market demand much more rapidly than almost any of the other South African 
(underground) operations. Its success has almost certainly influenced decisions to go ahead 
with small scale UG2 and Merensky open cast operations in the western Bushveld. 
During the latter part of 1996, Amplats began open cast operations at AmandelbulL(Figure 
6.1) on the Merensky Reef Metallurgical recoveries are reported to be in the region of 
75%-80% from ore from this pit. Amandelbult has some 20 km of strike (Figure 6.1) in this 
area, so this pit could be quite a long-lived operation. Swartklip, which has some 13 km of 
strike, has also started a Merensky and a UG2 open cast pit, with metallurgical recoveries 
reported to be 70% from the Merensky. These too could be fairly long-lived operations. All of 
these pits will be mined down to a vertical depth of 25-30m. A UG2 pit has also commenced 
at Boschfontein, south of the Impala properties. However, it appears that this pit is suffering, 
not from problems related to weathering, but rather from problems of dilution of ore with 
waste. A further complication in this area is the existence of a railway line, limiting the vertical 
depth of the pit to only 18m. Amplats are currently investigating the Merensky in this area, 
and it is expected that it will 
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come into production early in 1997. Union Section (Figure 6.1) is reported to be mining a 
UG2 open pit and investigating the possibility of a Merensky Pit (Diedricks, pers. comm., 
1996). Amplats have a block of ground, known as Boschkoppies, between Sun City and the 
Impala Properties. They also have quite a large block of ground, between EPL and CRM, 
known as the Pandora block, that has 4-Skm of UG2 outcrop that could be mined by open 
cast methods. In addition to this, Amplats has another 3-4km of Merensky Reef outcrop at 
Brakspruit Mine, west of Marikana. It is not known if Amplats are examining the possibility of 
open cast mining in these areas, but the potential certainly exists. 
The scale of these pits is difficult to estimate as, although Amplats holds all of the mineral 
rights in these areas, it is not known if they own the surface rights. Where they do not, it may 
or may not be possible to mine these resources, depending upon whether they would wish to 
negotiate with the land owners or not. 
Impala is known to be examining the possibility of mining some shallow Merensky resources 
by open cast methods. As mentioned previously, Impala unfortunately positioned their 
concentrator and smelting complex on much of their UG2 outcrop. Impala ha~ very little 
Merensky or UG2 strike length of either, exploitable by open cast methods (Figure 6.1). They 
possibly have 2-3 km of Merensky that they can open cast on the Impala property (Slabbert, 
pers. comm., 1996). However, Impala does have exploitable open cast reserves at the 
Crocodile River Mine, and possibly in the eastern Bushveld, in the Northern Province. 
Unfortunately, CRM has limited surface rights and Impala would have to either negotiate a 
mutually acceptable deal with the surface rights holders or purchase the ground outright, 
either of which would possibly greatly reduce the profitability of open cast mining in this area. 
Aquarius Exploration, an Australian company recently exercised its mineral rights options on a 
block of ground with virgin UG2 resources, near Kroondal, south of Rustenburg (Figure 6.1). 
With just over 6 km of strike, they are unlikely to become a major player in the South African 
PGM industry. Their novel approach to establishing an operating mine in the Bushveld on the 
UG2 is however, worthy of comment. 
Aquarius plan to mine much of their shallow ore initially by open cast mining, thereafter taking 
a decline down from the central box-cut to facilitate underground mining. The open cast 
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mining depth is planned at between 25 and 30m, at a mining cost of R40-R45/t of ore. The 
area has average PGM grades, and bulk testing has indicated that recoveries of between 55% 
and 60% can be expected from the open cast ore. One of the principal problems is that the 
UG2 leaders or markers closely approach the UG2 over much of the area. However, they are 
reported to carry higher than normal grade, and Aquarius is currently examining the possibility 
of mining the marker with the UG2, including the intervening hanging wall waste. To reduce 
the effect of this dilution, dense media separation, similar to that used on many of the small 
chromite mines in the region, is being tested. If this is successful, the stoping width will be 
sufficient to facilitate mechanized mining underground. The planned pit tonnage IS 
50 OOOt/month and thereafter 80 OOOt/month from underground (Dix, pers. comm., 1996). 
Like Russia, and the other major PGM producers of South Africa, BHP has become extremely 
secretive about its operations in the eastern Bushveld, specifically in Lebowa where they have 
had an active exploration programme for one or two years now. Depending on the local and 
regional dip of the Bushveld complex there, there is possibly potential for open cast mining 
once that project moves into a production phase. 
6.2 Summary: 
There is extensive interest at present, among all the major producers ofPGM's in the Bushveld 
Complex, in small scale open cast mining of both the UG2 and of the Merensky. Poj:entially 
new operations, such as the Aquarius Mine, are examining the possibility of open cast mining 
of shallow reserves to improve their cash-flow position during shaft sinking and construction 
phases, which will, it is believed, considerably reduce their borrowings or long term capital 
requirements. It also helps to maximize the exploitation of a limited resource, and will provide 
a better return, sooner, to shareholders. 
Established PGM producers are exploiting a previously ignored, and often much maligned, 
resource, usually to resolve short-term production problems, or spare capacity due to 
expansion. Some of these shallow resources are quite substantial (Amandelbult - 20 km strike; 
Swartklip - 13 km strike) and may be justifiable mining operations in their own right. 
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A number if technical issues can now be redefined and clarified. Firstly, deep and shallow ore 
need not be treated separately in the concentrator. In fact recent experience has shown that 
blending the two actually limits sliming in the concentrator, and does not seem to affect the 
recoveries which are on average 62.7%. Secondly, the dilution factor used (10%) was too 
high. A factor of 5%-7% is felt, in retrospect, t'o 'be sufficient. Thirdly, geological losses need 
careful consideration, based on experience and local knowledge. It appears as though the 
allowance for geological losses was a little too conservative, but judgment on this will be 
reserved until the current pit at EPL is complete. Geological losses will obviously vary greatly 
from one pit to another so this is a difficult factor to estimate, or for which to provide 
meaningful rules of thumb. 
Due to current depressed PGM prices, and rising working costs and productivity problems 
being experienced by the industry in South Africa, there may be an increase in open cast 
mining simply because it is more profitable. However, this requires that other, underground, 
production not be curtailed. The reason for this is that this would be too expensive 
(mothballing shafts, retrenchments, etc.). Open cast mining of shallow UG2 or Merensky 
resources could be a viable option to defer expensive underground production e~parision. It 
could also be utilized to replace worked out or dwindling underground resources in the short 
to medium term, depending on how much tonnage is available from such resources, rather 
than to replace those resources by underground development. Open cast operations can be 
operated on a fixed cost per ton basis, which is often a difficult goal to achieve in unde!"ground 
operations. 
The exploitation of shallow open cast resources should be utilized to maximize profits during 
period of depressed metal prices, and be viewed as something more than short-term, 
opportunistic, stopgap operations. With the existing infrastructure that is in place, these pits 
can be extremely profitable. 
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Appendices 
CELL 
ADDRESS 
AU76 
AU77 
AU7S 
AU 79 
A SO 
AUSI 
AU 82 
A 83 
AU 84 
AUS5 
AUS6 
AU 87 
AU 88 
AUS9 
AU 90 
AU 91 
AU 92 
AU 93 
AU 94 
AU 95 
AU 96 
AU 97 
AU9S 
AU 99 
A 100 
AU 101 
AU 102 
AU 103 
AU 104 
AU 105 
AU 106 
AU 107 
AU lOS 
AU 109 
A 110 
AU 111 
AU 112 
A 113 
RESERVES (tons) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
MINEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUI10N 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
RESERVES (tons) 
GEOLOGICAL LOSS 
MINEABLE TONS 
MINING DILUI10N 
% RECOVERY 
PGE RECOVERED 
REEF TONS 
MILLED TONS 
TONS MINED 
PGE kg in conc. 
PGEGRADE 
PGE kg in matte 
MATTE VALUATION (RIk 
ON-MINE COSTS 
MINING/t 
MILLlNG/t 
SMELTING COST/t 
TRANSPORT @42c/tlkm 
TOTAL COSTS/t OF ORE 
REVENUFJt 
SUNDRY COSTS 
\GROSS REVENUE 
GROSS COSTS 
GROSS PROFIT/t 
GROSS PROFIT (TOTAL) 
COSTIkg 
PROFITIkg 
MARGIN % 
APPENDIX 1 
FORMULAE FOR FINANCIAL TEMPLATE 
0-15m =$H$57 5H557: ORE TO:'\:'\AGE 0-15m 
10.0% =(AU76*0.1) 
< 
(ORE) =(AU76-AU77) 
10% =AU7S*0.1 
pgeR II\PL'T Recoyer-y % fOl· shallo" ore 
PGEkg =«AU7S*AU93 *AUSO}+(AU79*0.3 *AUSO»/10!l0 
15-30 m =$H$5S H557: ORE TO:-.i:-.iAGE 15-30m 
10.0% =(AU83 *0.1) 
(ORE) =(AUS3-AUS4) 
10% =AUS5*0.1 
pgeR INPL'T Recovery % for deep ore 
PGEkg =«AUS5*AU93*AU87}+(AUS6*0.3*AU87»)/1000 
TOTAL =AU76+AU83 
T =(AU7S+AU79+AUS5+AUS6) 
M =(A US9+SHS60) 
=(AUS1+AUSS) 
pgeG =$H$61 Corrected grade from Fig~re 
PGEkg =AU92 *0.99 
pgeP =$8$13 Randlkg as at April 1996 
=$8$21 Mining Cost I t of Ore 
ViPl:'T Milling Costs I t of Ore 
=$8$16 Smelting Cost I t of Ore - . 
~PUf Transport Costs 'Ii' 42clkm 
=(AUl03/AU90}+(AU97+AU9S+AU99+AUlOO) 
=«AU94*AU95»/AU90 
INPFf Total Sundry Costs 
=AUl02 *AU90 
=(AU97*AU90}+(AU9S*AU90}+(AU99*AU90}+(AUlOO*AU90}+AUl03 
=(AUlO4-AUlO5)/AU90 
=AUl06*AU90 
=AUl05/AU94 
=AUl07/AU94 
=AUl07/AUl04 
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